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Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article 
III Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias    
Sharon E. Rush
* 
ABSTRACT 
Each individual has a background, and that background shapes the individ-
ual’s views about life, creating an inevitable form of bias referred to as “experien-
tial bias.” Experiential bias is shaped by many identity traits, including, among 
others, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion and even geography. The geographic 
identity of state judges and their potential unfair experiential bias is the common 
justification for federal court diversity jurisdiction. But experiential bias is ines-
capable, affecting everyone who's ever had an experience, and is generally not 
unfair, as demonstrated by most studies regarding the "fairness" justification for 
diversity jurisdiction. More recently, Justice O’Connor connected racial and geo-
graphic identity in her Grutter opinion, specifically acknowledging that the expe-
riences associated with race and with growing up in a particular region shape a 
person’s views. This article explores how geographic identity and other identity 
traits are important to both federalism and equality principles because state iden-
tity is at the heart of federalism and individual identity is at the heart of equality. 
Both states and individuals, with the associated experiential biases stemming 
from geography and other identity traits, have interests in being represented in a 
democracy that values federalism and equality.  
In recent years, the geographic background of the United States Supreme 
Court, for instance, has shifted from one which is representative of the nation, to 
one dominated by appellate judges from the northeast. The importance of this 
shift cannot be overstated, as studies have shown that judges are as much as twice 
as likely to affirm opinions from their geographic “home” courts as those from 
any other. Also, as discussed following Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina woman" 
comment, the Court lacks diversity in ways that implicate equality principles as 
well. This article concludes that for purposes of federalism, diversity, and equali-
ty, the selection pool for Article III judges must be broadened in terms of both 
geography and experience. 
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“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” 
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What does a state’s interest in federalism have in common with an indi-
vidual’s interest in equality?  This Article offers an answer to this question by 
exploring the rich and complicated relationship among federalism, diversity, 
equality, and the Article III judiciary.  This relationship takes center stage in a 
number of cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  For example, 
in the 2013 term alone the Court decided cases involving the balance between 
federalism and equality in the areas of voting rights,
1
 gay rights,
2
 and affirma-
tive action.
3
  For the past several decades, the Court has been increasingly 
interested in deciding cases in which federalism and equality are pitted 
against each other.  This Article suggests that remarkable similarities exist 
between a state’s interest in federalism and an individual’s interest in equali-
ty.  An exploration of geography, identity, and bias in the context of the Arti-
cle III judiciary highlights those similarities. 
The idea for this exploration springs from the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court held that a state has a compelling 
interest in admitting a diverse class of students to its public universities,     
and can therefore use race as a factor in making admissions decisions.
4
   
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor opined: “Just as growing up in     
a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely      
to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of 
  
 1. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) 
(holding that federal law preempts Arizona’s proof of citizenship requirement for 
voting in federal elections); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 
(2013) (holding section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional because 
the formula used for evaluating whether a state needs preclearance is not up-to-date).  
 2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that section 
2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as between a man and a 
woman, is unconstitutional); Perry v. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) 
(holding that private party plaintiffs lacked standing to defend a state statute by chal-
lenging the lower courts’ rulings that California’s ban on same-sex marriage is uncon-
stitutional).  The Windsor decision further acknowledged that states have the authority 
to decide whether or not to allow same-sex marriage, but the federal government 
cannot deny the equal protection of same sex couples who are validly married by their 
state.  133 S. Ct. at 2691. 
 3. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (stating that “[s]trict 
scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions 
process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the 
evidence of how the process works in practice.”). 
 4. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
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being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately 
still matters.”
 5
 
No one is surprised that racial identity helps shape a person’s views      
or that valuing diverse viewpoints supports racial equality.  Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion, however, highlights that geographic identity also influ-
ences an individual’s views.  And, of course, federalism and geography are 
inextricably intertwined.  
Justice O’Connor’s observation, that both geographic and racial identity 
help shape an individual’s views, invites an exploration into the similarities 
between the two and how they relate to federalism and equality.  Understand-
ing this relationship is critically important, especially given the country’s 
history.  Significantly, geography and race shaped the states’ earliest identi-
ties, particularly in the ways that the country respected a state’s identity and 
sovereignty at the expense of slaves and their individual racial identities.
6
  
The desire of some states to expand slavery into the new Western territories 
created a major rift between states that began to identify as either “slave” or 
“free” states.
7
  These differences ultimately caused the Civil War. 
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, but the historical slavery 
divide that separated the North from the South had a lasting impact on the 
identities of those regions and the states and individuals within those regions.  
For example, the issue in the recent Supreme Court case Shelby County, Ala-
bama v. Holder was whether Shelby County, Alabama, and other counties 
and states more generally, no longer discriminated on the basis of race in its 
voting practices, thus freeing the county from having to seek preclearance 
from the federal government before implementing any changes to its voting 
laws.
 8
  Chief Justice Roberts asked during oral arguments if it was the gov-
ernment’s position that “the citizens in the South are more racist than citizens 
in the North[.]”
9
  At a press conference following the hearing, Shelby County 
Attorney Frank Ellis said, “We are a different and better nation today so it is 
only right that our federal laws should treat each of the 50 states equally.”
10
  
  
 5. Id. at 333. 
 6. See generally Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401 
(2013) (suggesting that constitutional doctrine should consider the way people inside 
a geographic space are treated to determine if discrimination exists).  
 7. Id. at 426.  
 8. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627-28 (2013). 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. 
Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-96.pdf; Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Law 
Draws Skepticism from Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/02/28/us/politics/conservative-justices-voice-skepticism-on-voting-law.html 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 10. Supreme Court Arguments Concluded in Shelby Co. Ala v. Holder,           
N.J. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nj.com/business/prnewswire/index.ssf?/ 
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Shelby County and Chief Justice Roberts’ question, along with the responses 
it generated, could not be more poignantly illustrative of the lingering effects 
slavery has had on the identity of both southern and northern states, as well as 
the individuals living in those states.   
Today, the tension between states’ interest in federalism, individuals’ in-
terest in equality, and their shared interest in protecting their identities as full 
participants in our democracy is evident in myriad contexts.
11
  Picture the 
images of people suffering in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katri-
na, or think of the executives sitting around a large walnut conference table at 
a corporate board meeting on Wall Street.
12
  Consider the importance of race 
and federalism in the contexts of gerrymandering,
13
 public education,
14
 health 
care,
15
 juvenile justice,
16
 and prison incarceration.
17
  As these examples illus-
trate, the mental picture of who inhabits what space is historically and cur-
rently racial. 
Part I of this Article highlights how state identity is central to Article   
III because, in our democracy and consistent with the Tenth Amendment, the 
state is the primary unit from which federalism is measured.
18
   States are 
  
nj/story/?catSetID=7012&catID=819202&nrid=193582041&page=37 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 11. See generally Boddie, supra note 6 (exploring how race defines many spac-
es, to the exclusion of people of color, often resulting in forms of discrimination that 
the law overlooks).  
 12. Of the Fortune 500 CEOs, only 4.2% are racial minorities (blacks are 0.8%, 
Asians are 1.8%, Latinos are 1.2%).  See Crosby Burns, Kimberly Barton & Sophia 
Kerby, The State of Diversity in Today’s Workforce: As Our Nation Becomes More 
Diverse so Too Does Our Workforce, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 12, 2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/07/12/11938/the-state-of-
diversity-in-todays-workforce/.  
 13. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1903 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulous, Spatial Diversity].  
 14. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1 
(2013); Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A 
Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (2013).  
 15. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Healthcare 
Disparities Report 2013, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2013), 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr13/2013nhdr.pdf . 
 16. See, e.g., Sophia Kerby, The Top 10 Most Startling Facts About People of 
Color and Criminal Justice in the United States: A Look at the Racial Disparities 
Inherent in Our Nation’s Criminal-Justice System, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 
2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2012/03/13/11351/thetop= 
10-most-star (70% of students referred for discipline were black or Hispanic).  
 17. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); KATHERYN RUSSELL-
BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME (NYU Press 2d ed. 2009).  
 18. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2010), for an interesting analysis of the role institutions other 
than states (and cities) play in “Our Federalism.”  
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identified by their geographic boundaries, the electoral college gives each 
state a voice in the election of the President,
19
 and each state is represented in 
Congress by two senators
20
 and a pro rata share of representatives in the 
House.
21
  Each state also has its share of Article III judges,
22
 making these 
judges essentially representatives of the states.  Admittedly, the judges’ Arti-
cle III life tenure and salary protection
23
 tend to camouflage the representa-
tional connection they have with the states and the people.  Those protections 
create an impression that the judges must be sealed off from the people pre-
cisely so the people cannot unduly influence the   judges, who must be inde-
pendent and impartial.  In reality, the idea that Article III judges are repre-
sentatives of the states and the people is found in the constitutional provisions 
that empower the President to nominate judges to the Article III bench, pro-
vide for Senate confirmation of the judges,
24
 and even in those provisions that 
provide for impeachment.
25
  The representational connections function to 
preserve important constitutional values: separation of powers, federalism, 
and individual liberties, including equal protection.  This Article focuses on 
the relationship among federalism, equality, diversity, and Article III.  
As important as it is to have each state represented in the Article III ju-
diciary, the Framers’ concern about states being biased in favor of their own 
citizens in state court provided the rationale for Article III’s diversity jurisdic-
tion.
26
  “Bias” in this context, of course, can only mean a shared “ideology” 
based on a shared geography between a litigant and his or her home state 
judge.
27
  Diversity jurisdiction allows a litigant to escape the potential unfair 
bias in state court by bringing his or her claim in federal court.
28
  
This Article explores this deep irony: states have a representational 
right, consistent with federalism, to participate in the Article III judiciary 
even as Article III provides individuals with a forum to escape state bias, 
consistent with equality.  The Framers acknowledged, and Congress goes to 
great lengths to preserve, the principle that a state’s representation as a state 
in the Article III judiciary is an important part of federalism.  For example, a 
state’s identity as a unified sovereign is a core aspect of federalism.  With one 
exception, no state in history has ever been required to disaggregate itself and 
violate its unified sovereignty by being geographically divided across circuit 
  
 19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
 22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144 (2012).   
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.   
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 26. See infra Part V.A. 
 27. See infra Part V.A. 
 28. See infra Part V.A. 
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court jurisdictions.
29
  Simultaneously, notwithstanding repeated proposals 
over the years, Congress has declined to pass legislation that would eliminate 
diversity jurisdiction.
30
  Thus, the irony persists. 
In a different but similar vein, sometimes judges with certain identity 
traits are accused of being unfairly biased against litigants who have different 
identity traits.  This is explored more fully in Part V, but a brief example is a 
female judge who presides over a sexual harassment suit brought by a woman 
against a man.  Notwithstanding accusations of unfair bias against the judge 
who is presumed to identify with the other woman, she has a right, consistent 
with equality principles, to be a judge.  
One way to begin to appreciate this irony is to gain a fuller understand-
ing of identity and bias.  Accordingly, in Part II, I focus on the concept of 
“experiential bias” to distinguish it from the bias associated with diversity 
jurisdiction or the bias leveled at the female judge in the sexual harassment 
case.  The meaning of “experiential bias” is largely self-evident; people make 
decisions based on what they have learned from their experiences.  This type 
of bias is enjoyed by every human being, and is presumed to be exercised by 
judges in a sound, reasonable, and fair manner.  Myriad individual identity 
traits inform a person’s experiential biases.  Race is one of the most obvious 
and is at the center of several recent cases, including Grutter
31
 and Shelby 
County.
32
  But, as the Grutter Court acknowledged, an individual’s experien-
tial bias is also informed by their geographic identity.
33
  In Part III, I explore 
seven valuable lessons we can learn from Grutter about the relationship 
among federalism, diversity, and equality.  Just as the Article III judiciary 
should be racially diverse as a matter of equality, so too must it be geograph-
ically diverse as a matter of federalism. 
Distinguishing between the unfair bias associated with diversity jurisdic-
tion and the experiential bias that is part of being human, and understanding 
how they interact, is necessary to protecting both federalism and equality.  
This is the main focus of Part IV of this Article.  A growing body of identity 
  
 29. Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Examining Accepted Prem-
ises of Regional Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 201, 244 (2011) (foot-
note omitted) (“[D]istrict boundaries have never crossed state lines.”).  The one ex-
ception is Wyoming, which was split because of the special geography of Yellow-
stone National Park.  See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 
675 (2005) (discussing the unique structure of the jurisdiction of the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming). 
 30. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: 
The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 
1829 (2008) [hereinafter Purcell, Class Action]. 
 31. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 32. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.  
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scholarship offers valuable insights about judicial bias.
34
  Identity scholarship 
sprouted from the need to address structural obstacles within our legal system 
that impede the attainment of equality by diverse groups.
35
  These groups 
were historically unrepresented in the government because of their identities 
and continue to fight for equality.  This struggle is multi-faceted, but two 
aspects are relevant to this Article.  First, the struggle has shown that all pub-
lic spaces, including seats on the judiciary, must be open to all citizens con-
sistent with equal protection. Simply being included in the right to share pub-
lic spaces, including the judiciary, is a matter of individual equality.  I refer to 
this as the “Individual Equality Principle.” 
Second, identity scholarship exposes hidden biases in judicial decisions 
that are presented as “neutral” but which favor historically privileged groups 
and, concomitantly, maintain the inequality of historically subordinated 
groups.
36
  For example, it is now well-recognized that people can unfairly 
judge other people based on the phenomenon of “unconscious racism.”
37
  
When a judge renders a decision that is rooted in unconscious racism, the 
effect is harmful to all racial minority groups and to the entire justice system.  
I refer to this as the “Group Equality Principle.” 
More and more, the Equality Principles are expressed as a need to have 
a diverse judiciary; however, it is important to emphasize that a desire to have 
a diverse judiciary – like a diverse classroom – is rooted in basic equality and 
representation principles.  Insights gained from identity scholarship are help-
ful in understanding how geographic diversity on the Article III judiciary is 
also supported by federalism.  Part V of this Article analyzes experiential bias 
in the context of federal jurisdiction (diversity and federal question) to 
demonstrate the relationship between the Individual Equality and the Group 
Equality Principles in the context of states’ rights to participate in Article III 
judicial decision making.  A diverse judiciary, including a geographically 
diverse judiciary, is the key to avoiding unfair bias or, more realistically, the 
key to ensuring that any unfair bias is shared relatively evenly among groups 
or states.  Critically important, a geographically diverse judiciary promotes 
federalism and is consistent with the Equality Principles because experiential 
bias that comes from being a citizen of a state adds a representational dimen-
sion to Article III judging.  
Although this Article draws on identity scholarship to support the       
argument that the Article III judiciary must be geographically diverse con-
sistent with federalism and the Equality Principles, two important points need 
to be made.  This Article is not suggesting that geographic identity is more 
important than or even as important as racial identity (or identity based on 
  
 34. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 380 (1987). 
 35. See id. at 326. 
 36. See Lawrence III, supra note 34. 
 37. Id.  
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other traits).  Rather, it is suggesting that there are remarkable similarities 
between states and their claims of sovereignty, and individuals and their 
claims of equality.  Race is not the only identity trait to bridge these two are-
as, but it is the primary one.  One only has to think of Jim Crow laws and the 
lingering effects of racial segregation to imagine how the experiences of peo-
ple on both sides of the color line shaped their identities.  Today, the greatest 
percentage of African Americans in the United States is in southern states, yet 
Alabama did not have its first African-American Article III judge until 
1980.
38
  These observations exemplify the important relationship among ge-
ography, federalism, equality, and Article III.  A major accomplishment of 
this Article is that it uniquely brings together these ostensibly unrelated con-
cepts and bodies of scholarship. 
Finally, Part VI of this Article focuses on diversity, particularly geo-
graphic diversity, and the Supreme Court.  In fact, a primary impetus for re-
searching and writing this Article was to explore how, over time, geography 
plays less and less of a role in the nomination process.  There are still nine-
teen states that have never been represented on the Court.
39
  Current members 
of the Court Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas 
served on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit prior to their appointments to the Supreme Court.
40
  Empirical studies 
show that the Justices, in a statistically significant way, vote to affirm deci-
sions coming from their home circuits.
41
  This suggests an unfair, albeit prob-
ably unconscious, bias at work.  This example barely touches the ways in 
which the Court has become less diverse, including geographically, a trend 
that started in the 1970s.
42
  This is cause for concern because the lack of geo-
graphic diversity at the highest level of judicial review results in an over-
representation of certain voices with similar experiential biases to the exclu-
sion of others.
43
  The concerns that the Court is not racially, religiously, and 
  
 38. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:      
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679,  
733 (1999). 
 39. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-
Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1163, 1163 n.82 (2012); see also 
infra Part VII.A.2.    
 40. One could say this makes them less biased because D.C. is not a state.  But 
see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not 
the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1578 (2010) (suggesting that Justices who 
are newcomers to the D.C. area are more influenced by the city’s “liberal bent” than 
are Justices who already reside in D.C. when they are appointed).  
 41. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. 
Segal, Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience Biases the Su-
preme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834 (2009). 
 42. See Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomina-
tion and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 615 
(2008); see also Barton, supra note 39, at 1172-73.  
 43. See infra Part VII.  
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gender diverse as a matter of equality have been at the forefront of discus-
sions about bias.  This Article adds to that concern by showing how federal-
ism and diversity are related to equality and representation principles.  
Putting geographic diversity into the discussion about federalism, Arti-
cle III, and the Equality Principles is important in itself.  This Article offers a 
timely opportunity to learn about this relationship because it is at the center of 
several recent Supreme Court cases.  For example, in the 2012 case Arizona 
v. United States the Court decided that Arizona’s power as a sovereign is 
limited with respect to its authority to regulate illegal immigration.
44
  This 
term, in addition to Shelby County, the Court decided Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin
45
 – a case which bears on Grutter and the continuing need for 
affirmative action.  Although the Fisher Court did not overrule Grutter, it 
might one day.  But even if Grutter were overruled it would not affect the 
rich and complicated relationship among equality, diversity, federalism, and 
Article III.  Rather, a deeper understanding of geography, identity, and bias 
would continue to tie them all together.  
II.  FEDERALISM AND GEOGRAPHY 
A.  The Importance of States 
“Federalism” means different things to different people.
46
  Beginning in 
the 1970s,
47
 the term “federalism” has often been equated with “states’ 
  
 44. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).  
 45. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).  
 46. To the original Federalists, including the authors of the Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and John Adams, it meant the United States should 
have a strong, centralized government.  See Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Founda-
tion” for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (1996).  Republicans, also known as Anti-Federalists, includ-
ing Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and George Mason, feared that too strong a 
national government would undermine the independence of the states.  See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the anti-
federalists in a historical context).  The ebb and flow of this debate is a central part of 
United States’ history, often played out in questions about Congress’ power to regu-
late commerce.  See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  Over the 
course of the ensuing 200 years, the Court has both broadened and narrowed the defi-
nition of commerce, always with a corresponding residual waxing and waning effect 
on state power.  Gregory W. Watts, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of “Eco-
nomic” Proportions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 545, 571 (2007).  The struggle over slavery, 
of course, was an instrumental aspect of this debate.  See generally Robert J. Kaczor-
owski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State 
Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015 (1997).  Today, the 
debate continues, not only in the area of commerce but also with respect to individual 
rights and Congress’ enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
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rights,” ironically an understanding that more closely resembles what the 
Anti-Federalists believed.
48
  Professor Heather Gerken aptly described feder-
alism when she said “[it] has always been understood to be a multiple-headed 
beast, with courts and scholars routinely deploying multiple and conflicting 
accounts of what states do.”
49
  The tension that characterizes the different 
understandings of federalism and the allocation of power between the nation-
al government and the states is seen even today, for example, in the debates 
over gay marriage and abortion.  
Regardless of how one defines federalism, the Framers clearly intended 
for it to reflect the United States’ democratic commitment to maintaining a 
constitutional boundary between the states and the federal government.  
While the federal and state governments struggled, and continue to struggle, 
with who is supposed to do what under the Constitution, the Framers insured 
that the states would have their voices heard and be represented in the federal 
government.  Not only is no state excluded from electing its federal repre-
sentatives, but the Constitution further ensures that each state’s voice is 
equally represented.
50
  The Supreme Court acknowledged over 100 years ago 
and reaffirmed in Shelby County that “[t]he constitutional equality of the 
States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the 
Republic was organized.”
51
  The Constitution has no favorite state; the con-
cept of a “United States” is, by design, the coming together of a diverse group 
of sovereign states to form a “more perfect Union.”
52
   
Equally important to the Framers, federalism acknowledged and valued 
the constitutional boundaries between states because each state is sovereign in 
its own right.  For example, the Constitution protects the sanctity of a state by 
prohibiting another state from being established within an existing state’s 
jurisdiction, and by prohibiting states or parts of states from joining together 
to establish a new state without the consent of the states and Congress.
53
  
Chief Justice John Marshall opined in McCulloch v. Maryland that “[n]o po-
litical dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines 
which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one 
  
ments, as Shelby County illustrates.  Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2621 (2013). 
 47. See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
1191, 1193-94 (1977). 
 48. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 
74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) (providing a detailed analysis of the post-Reconstruction 
view of a “Federalist” versus “Nationalist” model of the relationship between state 
and federal courts, or what the author calls “judicial federalism”). 
 49. Gerken, supra note 18, at 10. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.  
 51. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 
(1911) (federal government lacks power to locate state’s seat of government)). 
 52. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
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common mass.”
54
  Significantly, this opinion is embedded in the very case in 
which he upheld Congress’ Commerce Clause power to establish a national 
bank.
55
  From Chief Justice Marshall’s view, Congress’ Commerce Clause 
power, particularly when combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
was virtually limitless, leaving little room for states to participate in the regu-
lation of commerce.
56
  Given his broad reading of the Commerce Clause, 
Chief Justice Marshall’s comment on the importance of each state is even 
more remarkable. 
The Framers solidified this important relationship between the Article 
III judiciary and the states by providing in the Constitution that the Senate 
must approve the President’s judicial nominees.
57
  The Framers had many 
reasons for involving the Senate in the appointments process, including their 
commitment to having each state’s voice heard on an equal basis.
58
  How to 
protect smaller states from the larger states, of course, was a major focal point 
of the Constitutional Convention.
59
  Senators, a geographically diverse group 
by definition, could offer suggestions for candidates that otherwise might not 
come to the President’s attention because of his somewhat geographic isola-
tion at the seat of the government.
60
  Involving the Senate also ensured that 
the larger states would not be able to “outshout” the smaller states and dimin-
ish their standing as equal participants in the nomination process.  
Today, the selection of nominees to fill vacancies in the lower federal 
courts is largely managed by the Senate through the use of judicial selection 
committees situated in a senator’s home state.
61
  The President is not bound to 
accept a nominee through this process, but the process does promote federal-
ism.
62
  And, of course, great deference is given to the President’s constitu-
tional authority to nominate justices for the Supreme Court, but again the 
Framers ensured that states must approve the President’s choices.
63
 
  
 54. 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819). 
 55. Id. at 424. 
 56. Chief Justice Marshall opined, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of 
the constitution, are constitutional.”  Id. at 421.  Congress could not regulate com-
merce under a pretext, according to Justice Marshall, but it otherwise could regulate 
even intrastate activity that affected interstate commerce.  See id. at 423.  
 57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 58. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting 
Roles of the Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451, 
464 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 464-65. 
 60. Id. at 465-66. 
 61. Id. at 467.   
 62. See id.  
 63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Moreover, the importance of each state to the Article III judiciary is 
readily apparent by studying the way in which Congress, using its Article III 
power, initially structured the federal judiciary – a structure that continues to 
be respected.
64
  If each federal court were pinpointed on a map of the United 
States, one would see that each state has district courts
65
 and that geograph-
ically contiguous states
66
 are divided into geographic regions, each represent-
ing a circuit.
67
  The geographic organization of the Article III judiciary is 
partly due to efficiency concerns, but is also a result of federalism and state 
participation in protecting individual liberties.  It would be unthinkable for a 
state to have no federal district court judges.  The Constitution and its Article 
III judicial structure reflect a commitment to federalism’s principle that each 
state has an important relationship not just with its federally elected repre-
sentatives, but also with its non-elected federal judges who, in turn, protect 
individual liberties.    
But having an Article III judge presiding in its jurisdiction is only part 
of the story.  It would be unimaginable to have a Kansas resident sitting as a 
federal judge in Nebraska even if the Kansas resident lived closer to the 
courthouse than the Nebraska resident.  With few exceptions, federal law 
requires that district and appellate court judges reside in their districts.
68
   
Residency requirements imposed by Congress on Article III judges 
acknowledge the importance of the geographic connection those judges have 
with the citizens in their own states and circuits.  As important as the territo-
rial boundaries are that distinguish one state from another, the Framers under-
  
 64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 65. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144 (2006). 
 66. Puerto Rico is part of the First Circuit.  28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).  The Virgin 
Islands are part of the Third Circuit.  Id.  The District of Canal Zone is part of the 
Fifth Circuit.  Id.  Guam is part of the Ninth Circuit.  Id. 
 67. Id.  There are thirteen Courts of Appeals: First Circuit (Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico), Second Circuit (Connecticut, New 
York, Vermont), Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands), 
Fourth Circuit (Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), 
Fifth Circuit (District of Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas), Sixth Circuit 
(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee), Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wiscon-
sin), Eighth Circuit (Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota), Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam), Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexi-
co, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming), Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia), the 
D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit.  Id.  The Federal Circuit has national appellate 
jurisdiction over particular kinds of cases based on subject matter, for example, pa-
tents.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 68. For district court judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 134 (the exceptions for dis-        
trict court judges are the D.C. Circuit, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New 
York; in the New York districts, however, the judges must reside within twenty miles 
of their district).  For court of appeals judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 44 (the exception is the 
D.C. Circuit). 
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stood, as do we today, that a state is more than just a convenient way of mark-
ing political boundaries.  In other words, states are not just land masses; they 
are political power bases.  A state and its citizens are a community with a 
shared identity, developed through the course of history as the citizens live 
out their traditions and customs.  Florida and New York share a common 
national identity as sovereign states within the United States, but Florida’s 
identity is separate and different from that of New York.  Ask any Floridian 
or New Yorker – even if they do not identify “ideologically” with their state – 
and they will agree: it is one thing to be a Floridian and another to be a New 
Yorker.  The concept of geographic diversity reflects the reality that the Unit-
ed States is a union of fifty unique and sovereign states.  As sovereigns, each 
state is a “territorial community”
69
 that “arise[s] from the unique combina-
tions of geography, interests, and identity that characterize particular plac-
es.”
70
  The Supreme Court recognizes the individuality of states, for example, 
by calling them “labs of experimentation.”
71
     
As sovereign communities, states adopt flags, mottos, birds, flowers, 
and other symbols to distinguish themselves from each other and to establish 
their unique identities.  A significant part of a state’s identity is reflected in its 
laws,
72
 which, to a large extent, establish or reflect a state’s norms.
73
             
A state’s ability as a sovereign to establish who is or is not a citizen or a resi-
dent, conferring on those persons the various rights and privileges that attach 
to state membership, is one of the most important aspects of a state’s        
sovereignty.
74
  Perhaps one of the most poignant historical examples of this is 
  
 69. This term is commonly used in analyzing districting and gerrymandering 
issues.  See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial 
Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, 
Redistricting].  Unlike the districting area where geographic boundaries have to be 
drawn, the geographic boundaries of states as “territorial communities” – the most 
fundamental for federalism purposes – are established.  Id. at 1386; see also Stepha-
nopoulos, Spatial Diversity, supra note 13, at 1922 n.74. (“community of interest” is 
based on ideology and is different from territorial community).     
 70. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 69, at 1385; see also Stephanopou-
los, Spatial Diversity, supra note 13, at 1974 n.288 (providing examples of communi-
ties that are bound together by culture and race).  
 71. This idea has been put forward by Justices Brandeis and O’Connor, among 
others.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)) (“[Federalism] promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try nov-
el social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”).  
 72. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:       
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249,           
316-19 (1992). 
 73. Id. at 318-19. 
 74. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 526-
27 (2009). 
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the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, in which the Court held that 
Missouri law rather than federal law governed the question of whether Mr. 
Scott was a free man after traveling to a free state.
75
  Laws establishing state 
membership, of course, can be unconstitutional because they interfere with 
Congress’ power to regulate in a field such as immigration, as they were in 
the recent cases in Arizona.
76
  State membership laws can also violate the 
Equality Principles.   
An individual’s constitutional rights can be denied by a state even when 
the individual is clearly a state citizen.  The internment of Japanese Ameri-
cans during World War II is a poignant example.  In Korematsu v. United 
States,
77
 the Supreme Court upheld the detention of Japanese American citi-
zens on the sole basis of race, a clear abridgment of their Equal Protection 
and Due Process rights.
78
  Notice that issues of race and ethnicity gave rise to 
all of these iconic examples. 
Importantly, as the Arizona immigration cases illustrate, while the Su-
premacy Clause requires state laws to be constitutional there is often a lot of 
leeway for individual states to function, to be “labs of experimentation,” in 
ways that reflect their citizens’ norms without violating the Constitution.
79
  
For example, a state might not provide for the death penalty as a form of pun-
ishment in its criminal justice system even though the Supreme Court has 
held that imposing the death penalty does not violate the Constitution.
80
  Be-
ing a “death penalty” or a “non-death penalty” state is one part of a state’s 
identity.  Today, a fight between the states and the courts is being waged over 
whether states can maintain their identities as “no gun regulation” states.
81
  
States that want stricter gun regulations don that identity as well. 
To summarize thus far, state citizens, though also drawn together as a 
political unit because of their sovereignty, are drawn together by their more 
holistic sovereign identity that represents their histories, traditions, and cul-
tures.  Our history of slavery and racial inequality continues to shape the 
identity of many states, particularly the southern states.  State citizens gener-
ally are proud to be members of their state even if they do not identify with 
particular aspects of their state’s identity.  Geographic identity is as real as it 
is mysterious.  The mystery surrounding what it means to be from different 
  
 75. 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856) (finding that although citizenship for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction in federal court is determined by federal law, the status of an 
individual as property or person is determined by the law of the state in which he 
resides or is owned). 
 76. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 77. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
 78. Id. at 219-20. 
 79. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2518-19. 
 80. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). 
 81. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); Jordan E. 
Pratt, Uncommon Firearms as Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Jo-
seph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013). 
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states is what federalism is all about; it also is at the center of the need for 
diversity jurisdiction.     
B.  Diversity Jurisdiction 
Diversity jurisdiction has always been controversial.  Professor Charles 
Warren, one of the most notable scholars on federal jurisdiction, made an 
observation about the earliest debates over diversity jurisdiction that is worth 
reflection.  He said: “There was no part of the Federal jurisdiction which had 
sustained so strong an attack from the Anti-Federalists, or which had received 
so weak a defense from the Federalists as that which gave them power over 
‘controversies between citizens of different states.’”
82
  The Anti-Federalists’ 
struggle to keep diversity cases in state courts suggests a possible distrust of 
federal judges to adjudicate state issues.  It also suggests the Anti-Federalists’ 
preference for their state judges to adjudicate cases involving their own citi-
zens.  Both suggestions are consistent with the most common perception 
about the need for diversity jurisdiction: bias.
83
  
Ask first year law students why diversity jurisdiction exists and the an-
swer is likely to be that the Framers provided for it in Article III because they 
feared state judges would be biased against non-resident litigants.
84
  In other 
words, the perceived need for diversity jurisdiction rests on the premise that it 
allows an out-of-state litigant to escape the bias of a state judge who identi-
fies with the in-state litigant simply because they are from the same state.  
The shared geographic identities of the judge and the in-state litigant could 
theoretically prevent the non-resident litigant from getting a fair trial. 
As ingrained as this first year law school lesson is, no definitive answer 
seems to exist as to why the Framers provided for diversity jurisdiction in-
volving citizens of different states, although it is clear that the whole grant of 
diversity jurisdiction in Article III was premised on state courts favoring their 
own litigants in party-based cases.  In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton 
expressed his opinion: 
[T]he reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in 
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks 
for itself.  No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in 
any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.  This 
principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal 
courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies 
between different States and their citizens . . .  The laws may have 
even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in 
  
 82. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1829 n.19 (quoting Charles Warren, 
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 
81 (1923)).  
 83. See Warren, supra note 82, at 83. 
 84. Id.  
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favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged.  And even 
where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as 
men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own gov-
ernment.
85
 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux 
reflects a similar sentiment: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will ad-
minister justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every 
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either enter-
tains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the 
possible fears and apprehensions of suits, that it has established na-
tional tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a 
citizen, or between citizens of different states.
86
 
Feeding the bias premise is a common perception that state court judges 
lack judicial independence and are subject to political influence because they 
want to be reelected or reappointed.
87
  In a recent article, however, Professor 
Brian Fitzpatrick persuasively demonstrates the fallacy of this assumption.
88
  
His work supports the view that, historically, “state court judges were elected 
and the vast majority of them enjoyed life tenure.”
89
  Most state judges, in 
other words, historically enjoyed the same protections of judicial independ-
ence as Article III judges.  In fact, many federal judges at that time had expe-
rience as state judges.
90
  Accordingly, when Congress initially provided for 
diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it had little, if any, reason 
to be concerned about unfair judicial geographic bias.
91
 
Congress and Hamilton were concerned, however, about state legisla-
tures enacting laws that favored their own citizens and state juries being un-
fairly biased against creditors.
92
  Diversity jurisdiction allowed out-of-state 
  
 85. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro          
ed., 2009). 
 86. 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). 
 87. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 839, 842 (2012).   
 88. See id. at 862. 
 89. Id. at 893. 
 90. Id. at 891. 
 91. See id. at 886-88. 
 92. Id. at 890; see also Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument:         
The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.   
997 (2007) (suggesting jury bias was of greater importance to the Framers than    
judicial bias when deciding that federal courts, rather than state courts, should hear 
diversity claims). 
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litigants to avoid those biases.  Prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
93
 out-of-
state litigants were able to avoid unfavorable state substantive law because 
under Swift v. Tyson Article III judges sitting in diversity cases could ignore 
unclear state laws and apply a general federal common law.
94
  Even the 
Framers thought this was constitutional.
95
  Moreover, defendants avoided 
state juries who were biased against creditors by seeking out the “more urban 
and pro-creditor federal jury pools.”
96
  These more complex justifications for 
diversity jurisdiction generally are not part of the first year Civil Procedure 
course and students continue to learn the much simpler geographic identity 
bias justification. 
Questioning whether the need to escape bias ever justified diversity ju-
risdiction, some scholars and practitioners suggest that even if bias was the 
original reason, today it is no longer applicable.
97
  Specifically, being able to 
avoid local bias by filing a suit in, or removing it to, federal court to avoid 
unfavorable state substantive law has been obviated by Erie and its progeny.
98
  
From the Erie line of cases, and consistent with the Rules of Decision Act,
99
 
it is now clear that a federal judge hearing a diversity case is not free to ig-
nore state substantive law.
100
  Whether federal juries are less susceptible to 
local bias than state juries is an interesting question.  Notice that the historical 
concern about jury bias was premised on the idea that both state and federal 
jury pools were biased, but for different reasons associated with geography 
and federalism. 
In any event, many scholars and practitioners suggest that diversity ju-
risdiction should be abolished.
101
  Astonishingly, this is not a modern debate; 
it has been going on since the Civil War.
102
  As Professor Edward Purcell 
documents, some scholars take the position that diversity jurisdiction is theo-
retically indefensible;
103
 however, practitioners have successfully lobbied to 
keep Congress from abolishing it.
104
  From the practitioners’ point of view, 
escaping potential local bias is a legitimate reason to keep diversity jurisdic-
  
 93. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 94. 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64. 
 95. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 890. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., id. at 890-93. 
 98. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 100. Id. (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties 
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regard-
ed as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.”) 
 101. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1829. 
 102. See id.  
 103. See id. at 1833-35. 
 104. See id. at 1848. 
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tion.
105
  Indeed, attorneys have testified before Congress to express their con-
cerns about this problem.
106
  One attorney said, “I remove qualified cases to 
federal court . . . to avoid being ‘home-towned’ by the judge and/or jury.”
107
  
Some practitioners also contend that their clients’ needs are better served in 
federal court, and the attorneys themselves also prefer a federal forum.
108
  
There are many reasons an attorney or client might prefer a federal forum to a 
state forum.
109
  In any event, a debate over the question of whether Congress 
should abolish diversity jurisdiction is intractable and variables other than the 
issue of local bias – such as expense and efficiency – enter into the discus-
sion.  Ultimately, whether Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction is a 
policy question, and thus far those in favor of keeping it have prevailed.
110
 
Much harder to answer, and more relevant to the local bias issue, is the 
question of whether Congress actually has the constitutional authority to abol-
ish diversity jurisdiction.  For purposes of this Article, one possible answer is 
that Congress does not have the authority to abolish diversity jurisdiction if a 
litigant has a right, perhaps as a matter of due process, to avoid the potential 
unfair local bias of a state court by choosing to have their case heard before 
an Article III judge.  This view posits that the choice to go to a federal court 
under diversity jurisdiction is constitutionally protected by Article III and 
Congress thus cannot take it away.  
As long as Congress does not abolish diversity jurisdiction, a definitive 
answer to whether it would have the authority to do so will remain elusive.  
Moreover, the association of diversity jurisdiction with the need to escape 
local bias persists even though there is scant, if any, empirical evidence to 
support the bias theory.
111
  Professor Purcell aptly describes the current un-
derstanding of why diversity jurisdiction was created, stating, “The historical 
record gave sparse indication why the framers and ratifiers adopted the juris-
diction, and the scattered bits of evidence suggested only that they intended it 
to provide protection against some kind of bias or unfairness, real or antici-
pated, that non-residents might encounter in the states.”
112
  Moreover, to the 
  
 105. See id.  
 106. See id. at 1848 & n.89 (citing testimony before Congress).   
 107. Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifica-
tions for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 145 (2009). 
 108. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1846.  
 109. Id. at 1846; see also Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 138-39 (stating that a party 
might prefer federal or state procedural rules, for example).  
 110. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1841-45, 1847-48 (illustrating the 
detailed history of attempts to abolish diversity jurisdiction). 
 111. Id. at 1847-48.  
 112. Id. at 1833 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, 
The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 119, 123-24 
(2003) (suggesting there is scant evidence to support the theory that diversity jurisdic-
tion was created to avoid local bias, but neither is there evidence to support another 
reason for creating it).  
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extent bias is a concern, federal judges also are prone to it.
113
  What is signifi-
cant to highlight is that the perceived need to escape bias is centered solely on 
local bias associated with the state as a geographic unit.  
This reality invites a closer examination of the concept of “bias.”  Just as 
bias is a central concern in an exploration of states, federalism, and Article 
III, it also is a central concern in an exploration of individuals, equality, and 
Article III.  Justice O’Connor’s comment from Grutter suggests that she 
agrees, at least to the extent that the experiences one has growing up in a re-
gion influences a person’s views in much the same way that being a racial 
minority influences one’s views.
114
  Significantly, this Article builds on and 
strengthens the connections among federalism, equality, diversity, and Article 
III by exploring what “bias” means in the context of federalism and equality. 
III.  BIAS 
“Bias” tends to be an emotionally charged word, often associated with 
prejudice and unfairness.  That is the sentiment behind diversity jurisdiction.  
However, the dictionary also defines “bias” as a “preference.”
115
  Having a 
preference for something does not carry the same negative implications.   
Accordingly, when questions about bias arise the real concern is not 
whether a judge (or a jury) is biased or has preferences, because they all do.  
This is referred to as “experiential” bias, meaning that people make decisions 
based on the knowledge they acquire from the experiences they have.
116
  This 
is explored more fully below, but note that state judges and Article III judges 
have common geographic identities because of the way the Article III judici-
ary is structured, consistent with federalism.
117
  Naturally, experiential bias is 
informed by myriad factors and influences in a person’s life.
118
  This Article 
posits that geography – like race, sex, sexual orientation, and other identity 
traits – is an instrumental factor in shaping a person’s views. 
This observation is supported by showing how concerns about bias in 
the context of diversity jurisdiction are remarkably similar to concerns about 
bias in the context of equality.  Even though many state judges and Article III 
judges share similar geographic identities, states nevertheless have a federal-
ism right to be represented on the Article III bench.  Similarly, historically 
  
 113. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1847-49.   
 114. 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (“Just as growing up in a particular region or hav-
ing particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too 
is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, 
in which race unfortunately still matters.”). 
 115. Bias, Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition 
Definition of Bias. 
 116. Experiential, Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged 10th 
Edition Definition of Experiential.  
 117. See infra Part III.B. 
 118. See infra Part III.B.  
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disenfranchised groups who have been the target of unfair bias (prejudice) 
also have an equality right to be represented on the Article III bench.  This 
analogy is important because it exposes the similarities and differences be-
tween two constitutional values that are deeply associated with Article III. 
A.  Questions of Fairness 
Determining whether a judge is fair is a delicate evaluation.  What in-
formation judges, especially Article III judges, rely on or should rely on to 
form their opinions is the concern of much debate and scholarly attention.
119
  
Are judges too ideological, wedded too much to originalism,
120
 or not wedded 
enough?  Recently, scholars have studied the extent to which judges rely on 
“intuition.”
121
  Reasonable people will disagree over the “right” answers to 
some of these questions.  Moreover, the debates over what is appropriate or 
inappropriate for judges to rely on in their decision making are not likely to 
end.  However, two points about what judges cannot rely on as they make 
decisions are generally uncontested by reasonable people.   
1.  Conflicts of Interest 
First, judges cannot rely on their own abilities to avoid being unfairly 
biased in cases in which they have a conflict of interest with one of the par-
ties.  No matter how “good” a judge is, his or her ability to be fair in such 
situations will always be doubted and even the appearance of a conflict of 
interest ethically requires recusal.
122
  In other words, a conflict of interest, or 
the appearance of a conflict of interest, deems a judge unfair.  Justice Elena 
Kagan, for example, recused herself from several cases pending before the 
Court, including the Arizona and Fisher cases, because she had been involved 
with them in her position as U.S. Solicitor General.
123
  
  
 119. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and 
the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 (2013) (discussing originalism and 
non-originalism and what each group relies on to form its opinions). 
 120. See id. (offering a way to harmonize the debate over originalism versus non-
originalism as the “right” method of constitutional interpretation). 
 121. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (stating that federal judges are re-
quired to recuse themselves “in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned”).  
 123. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg 
Law): Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloom-
berg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/ (stating that Justice Kagan recused herself from 
twenty-eight out of seventy-five cases her first term). 
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2.  Prejudice 
Second, judges who are openly prejudiced against certain classes of 
people or particular issues also cannot rely on their own abilities to escape 
their prejudices in any given case.  Being prejudiced is different from having 
a conflict of interest.  “Prejudice” is used to mean an unfair bias where that 
bias is built on stereotypes or is anchored in negative feelings, perhaps even 
animosity, toward an individual or a group.  A judge who is a member of the 
Ku Klux Klan, for example, cannot judge a race discrimination case fairly.  
The Court has held that legislation enacted out of prejudice
124
 or animus
125
 is 
unreasonable and unconstitutional.  Poignantly, this formed the basis for the 
majority’s conclusion in United States v. Windsor that the Defense of Mar-
riage Act “is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and 
effect to disparage and to injure those [same sex couples] whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”
126
  
Similarly, judicial decisions based on prejudiced views are unreasona-
ble.  For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court remanded a case 
involving a Caucasian family, in which the state judge gave custody of a child 
to the father because the mother had cohabited with and then married an Afri-
can-American man following the parents’ divorce.
127
  The Court feared that 
decisions by a judge based on race were “more likely to reflect racial preju-
dice than legitimate public concerns.”
128
  Some might argue that, with respect 
to judges being prejudiced, there is a difference between a state judge and an 
Article III judge.  Because state judges are elected or appointed by an elected 
official (the governor), some might argue that the citizens of a state have a 
right to elect, directly or indirectly, a prejudiced judge.  Undoubtedly, this is 
true.  In fact, even legislation that is unconstitutional because it is based on 
prejudice has, on occasion, received a vote of support by a majority of the 
state citizens.
129
  Again, that is part of the democratic process.  But if a state 
judge renders a prejudiced opinion in violation of the Equality Principles, an 
appellate state judge is obligated to strike it down.  If the Supreme Court is 
the ultimate arbiter in such cases, it also has the constitutional duty to correct 
the unfairness, as it did in Palmore.
130
  The checks and balances built into the 
  
 124. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 
(1985) (requiring special use permit for home for “mentally retarded” was motivated 
by irrational prejudice because other institutions not required to get permits). 
 125. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (holding that      
Colorado Amendment Two denying equal protection to gays motivated by animus    
is unconstitutional).  
 126. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 127. 466 U.S. 429, 430-31, 434 (1984). 
 128. Id. at 432.  
 129. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing anti-
miscegenation laws). 
 130. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434. 
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judicial process ideally weed out prejudiced judicial decisions.  Thus, while 
state citizens can use their voice to elect prejudiced judges, ultimately that 
voice will be drowned out by application of the Equality Principles at the 
appellate level.   
Is this analysis different for Article III judges?  Again, because the Pres-
ident and Senate, both majority institutions, are the guardians of the Article 
III bench, it is possible for prejudiced judges to be confirmed as Article III 
judges.  Recently, Judge Edith Jones of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit was accused of being racially biased because she alleged-
ly said that African Americans and Hispanics are “predisposed to crime.”
131
  
Because of complaints challenging her ability to be fair, Chief Justice Roberts 
ordered a formal review of her record by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
132
   
This example highlights how delicate issues of judicial bias can be.  
Reasonable people will disagree about whether Judge Jones’ comment re-
flects racial bias.  But the call for an official review indicates how important 
it is for judges to be fair and to be perceived as such, regardless of “popular” 
sentiments.  In the nomination process for Article III judges, a known preju-
dice typically is a severe handicap and dooms a nominee’s chances of suc-
cessful confirmation.  President Nixon’s nominations of both Clement 
Haynsworth of South Carolina and Harold Carswell of Florida failed because 
both men strongly supported racial segregation.
133
  Reasonable people agree 
that a nominee who openly opposes the Equality Principles is unfit. 
Moreover, as “good” as a judge is, and no matter how much a judge 
might think that he or she is able to put aside his or her prejudices, prejudices 
often operate on people in ways of which they are not even aware.
134
  Criti-
cally important, no reasonable person would accept that a prejudiced judge 
could render a fair decision in a case that involved people or issues that 
aroused the judge’s prejudices.  For example, regardless of the results of the 
D.C. Circuit’s formal review of Judge Jones, her integrity as a fair judge who 
is not racially prejudiced is impugned.  The “experiential bias” of most Afri-
can Americans and Hispanics will mean that these groups are likely to be 
especially critical of her impartiality. The integrity of our judicial system 
depends on people believing that it treats individuals fairly and equally.  
  
 131. Stephanie Condon, Conservative Judge Edith Jones up for Rare Review, 
CBS NEWS (June 13, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-
57589149/conservative-judge-edit-jones-up-for-rare-review/. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See infra notes 349-350 and accompanying text. 
 134. See infra Part VI. 
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B.  Experiential Bias 
Just as reasonable people agree that judges with conflicts of interest or 
known prejudices are likely to adjudicate unfairly and therefore should recuse 
themselves in appropriate cases, reasonable people also agree that judges are 
human beings whose experiences influence their views.  Indeed, the basis for 
a prejudiced view, which is unreasonable, or a non-prejudiced view, which is 
reasonable, stems from an individual’s experiences.  For example, a person 
might have a negative experience with a person from a different racial group 
and unreasonably extrapolate from that experience to harbor negative senti-
ments toward other people in that racial group, or a person might be taught 
unreasonable and untrue lessons about particular groups.  Sometimes learning 
such lessons is intentional, which is consistent with someone being knowing-
ly prejudiced.  Some parents, for example, teach their children to be racist.  
However, sometimes learning unreasonable and untrue lessons can be done 
unwittingly, and by very loving and equality-minded people.  These kinds of 
lessons form the basis for unconscious bias, which is different from prejudice, 
but is also unfair. 
Given that all people, including judges, are experientially biased, it is 
important to understand the concept of “unconscious bias.”  Identity scholars 
explore how a judge’s unconscious bias – that is, a bias the judge is not even 
aware he or she has – can influence the judge’s decision making in ways that 
promote inequality.
135
  How someone can be “unconsciously” biased is not 
easy to understand.  Continuing to use racial equality as an example, modern 
studies and legal jurisprudence
136
 accept the existence and legitimacy of the 
concept of “unconscious racism.”
 137
  Professor Charles Lawrence articulated 
the concept: 
  
 135. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist 
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500 (1998) (discussing how the visibility factor in 
the test for application  of heightened scrutiny may accidentally promote inequality 
because those not discriminated against may not understand that utilizing visibility as 
a criterion for protection is impliedly demanding that “invisible” groups hide). 
 136. See Developments in the Law – Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1472, 1559-60 (1998).  The seminal article on unconscious racism is The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.  See Lawrence 
III, supra note 34.   
 137. See, e.g., PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2014).  “Project Implicit” at Harvard University offers an online test 
that anyone can take to better understand the concept of implicit bias, including their 
own.  Id.  It also has an extensive bibliography on recent studies about implicit bias.  
Project Implicit Publications, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net 
/papers.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).   
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A crucial factor in the process that produces unconscious racism is the 
tacitly transmitted cultural stereotype. . . .  [T]he lesson is not explicit: 
It is learned, internalized, and used without an awareness of its source.  
Thus, an individual may select a white job applicant over an equally 
qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was based on 
observed intangibles unrelated to race. . . .  He is unaware of the 
learned stereotype that influenced his decision.  Moreover, he has 
probably also learned an explicit lesson of which he is very much 
aware: Good, law-abiding people do not judge others on the basis of 
race.
138
 
Meanwhile, Justice O’Connor opined in one of her dissents that “[i]t is by 
now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white 
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, 
perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.”
139
  
A judge who is openly racist, of course, falls into the prejudiced judge 
category.  A judge who is not even aware that he or she falls into the uncon-
scious racism arena typically is an equality-minded person who would never 
think of him or herself as racially prejudiced.  Moreover, the equality-minded 
spectrum is broad.  For example, most people might consider a person who 
uses the N-word racist; however, the controversy surrounding Paula Deen’s 
admitted use of this word exemplifies how varied the views are on even this 
point.
140
  One person, identified as a white man, in support of forgiving Ms. 
Deen, opined, “Everybody in the South over 60 used the N-word at some 
time or the other in the past.”
141
  Another supporter, an African-American 
woman, said, “I get it, believe me . . .  But what’s hard for people to under-
stand is that she didn’t mean it as racist . . . [t]hat’s not what’s in her heart.  
She’s just from another time.”
142
  Understanding what is or is not “racist,” of 
course, is one thing.  But a decision based on unconscious racism is clearly 
unfair.  This is the heart of identity scholarship’s endeavor: to expose the 
hidden biases that otherwise come from “reasonable” people.  
Moreover, unconscious unfair biased decision making, of course, is not 
limited to the area of race relations.  The tendency to stereotype, consciously 
or unconsciously, is something most humans do.  Modern studies demonstrate 
that most of us make decisions based on stereotypes in a matter of a split sec-
  
 138. Lawrence III, supra note 34, at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 139. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 140. See, e.g., Ann Oldenburg, Fans Support and Defend Paula Deen, USA 
TODAY (June 24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/ 
2013/06/24/fans-support-defend-paula-deen/2451559/. 
 141. Kim Severson, At Georgia Restaurant, Patrons Jump to Defend a Chef from 
Her Critics, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/06/23/us/in-the-south-many-are-willing-to-forgive-deens-racial-
misstep.html?pagewanted?3Dall&_r=1&. 
 142. Id.  
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ond, perhaps without even knowing it.
143
  Fortunately, our legal system, and 
in particular the Supreme Court, is increasingly sensitive to the need to es-
chew stereotypes because they undermine the Equality Principles.
144
  Justice 
O’Connor’s quotation exemplifies that we are making progress.   
Thus, to be experientially biased – to have a point of view – because    
of one’s identity is not cause for recusal; no one would be able to be a judge 
if it were.  Experiential bias, then, is a natural part of judging.  However,      
to be a fair judge requires a willingness to consider the possibility that        
one might be unconsciously biased.
145
  Helping make equality-minded and 
loving people aware of this possibility is an enormous and daunting chal-
lenge.  Speaking from my own experiences as a white person who cares deep-
ly about racial equality and who has devoted her whole life to helping achieve 
it, I did not realize how unconscious racism worked in my own mind until I 
fell in love with my black daughter and started to bear witness simply living 
our daily lives.
146
        
IV.  GRUTTER’S LESSONS ABOUT FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, 
EQUALITY, AND ARTICLE III 
The inclusion of individuals and groups in the democratic process evi-
dences a respect for their rights to have their experiential biases influence 
learning and decision making.  While their inclusion is about representation 
and equality, it often is couched in terms of “diversity.”  In Fisher v. Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the 
University of Texas unlawfully denied the equal protection rights of Abigail 
Fisher, a self-identified white applicant, because of her race when it denied 
her application for admission.
147
  Under the University’s admissions policy, 
University officials consider race as one factor among many in its efforts to 
admit a “diverse” class.
148
  As mentioned earlier, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of this type of admissions policy in Grutter.
149
   
  
 143. See generally B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and 
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 287 (2006).  
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  In striking 
down the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women as a denial of equal protec-
tion, Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority that VMI’s justification for the exclusion 
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females.”  Id.  
 145. See infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text (where Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized that she would strive to be impartial and fair even though she had said 
that her experiences as a Latina did influence her views). 
 146. I detail this in my book, SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR 
LINE: A WHITE ADOPTIVE MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2000). 
 147. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
 148. Id. at 2416-17. 
 149. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).  
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The Fisher Court, in a 7 to 1 decision,
150
 held that both lower courts 
erred by giving too much deference to the University’s assertion that it     
operated in “good faith” in administering the admissions policy.
151
             
The Fisher Court agreed with Grutter that it is a university’s decision wheth-
er to consider race in its admissions policy in order to admit a diverse class, 
but once it has made that decision and it is challenged in court a judge must 
determine if the university’s method of achieving this objective meets strict 
scrutiny.
152
  The university has the burden of proof to establish that the meth-
od it chose to achieve its goal of diversity is narrowly tailored.
153
  In other 
words, “[t]he reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable 
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversi-
ty.”
154
  Understanding the relationship between equality and diversity helps to 
distinguish between prejudice and experiential bias.  Toward this end, and 
because Fisher affirms Grutter, it is useful to analyze seven valuable lessons 
from these cases. 
A.  Lesson One: Diversity and Equality Are Related 
The Grutter and Fisher Courts’ affirmation of the connection between 
diversity and equality is significant and related to the major point of this Arti-
cle.  Just as federalism has strong connections to race and geography, the 
most natural and logical starting point for understanding equality is in the 
context of race and racial equality.  The concept of diversity found its way 
into Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence through the Equal Protection 
Clause.
155
  More fully, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitu-
tion to establish the rights of the newly-freed slaves to be full citizen partici-
pants in our democracy.
156
  It marked the beginning of our democracy’s 
commitment to include the voices of racial minorities, particularly the newly 
freed slaves, in shaping the law.  They became free to represent themselves.  
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court, in its first interpretation of the Four-
  
 150. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Alito, Breyer, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 
2414.  Justice Ginsburg dissented and Justice Kagan recused herself due to a conflict 
of interest.  Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Step Up Scrutiny in College Entry, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/affir-
mative-action-decision.html?_r=0. 
 151. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals con-
fined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s 
good faith in its use of racial classifications . . . .”).  
 152. Id. at 2421.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 2420.  
 155. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.  
 156. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389 (2004). 
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teenth Amendment, opined that if the Equal Protection Clause was intended 
to protect anyone, surely it was intended to protect the newly-freed slaves 
from discrimination on the basis of race.
157
   
Since Slaughterhouse, it is clear that all racial groups are protected from 
discrimination.  This seems perfectly logical because all people have a race.  
But it was not until Allan Bakke, a self-identified white person, challenged 
the University of California Davis School of Medicine’s admissions policy, 
which set aside sixteen of 100 seats for racial minorities, that diversity in 
public education became a popular concern about racial equality.
158
  While 
the Court held that the set-aside program denied Bakke equal protection,
159
 
the opinion provided much fodder for the Justices about the value to U.C. 
Davis of having a racially diverse medical school class
160
 and what level of 
review the policy had to meet in order to pass constitutional muster.
161
  Some 
Justices distinguished affirmative action laws that were intended to help racial 
minorities from racial discrimination laws that hurt minorities.
162
  A plurality 
held that this distinction justified applying an intermediate standard of review 
to affirmative action policies.
163
  Justice Powell, voting with the plurality, 
wrote separately to opine that the set-aside policy, because it was a racial 
classification, should be subject to strict scrutiny just like any classification 
based on race.
164
  Moreover, while he would not have upheld the set-aside, he 
did think it would be constitutional for a public college to consider an appli-
cant’s race as one factor among many in a holistic review of an application – 
in essence, the holding adopted by Grutter.
165
  “Diversity” thus became a 
compelling state interest that can be pursued as long as a public university 
does not violate the Individual Equality Principle.
166
  
B.  Lesson Two: Diversity Overshadows Equality 
The Bakke and Grutter Courts paved the way for the concept of “diver-
sity” ultimately to substitute for “equality” in the context of race and public 
university admissions processes.
167
  Ironically, the Grutter Court did this 
primarily by relying on Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke and affirming 
the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s holistic 
  
 157. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).  
 158. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275-79 (1978). 
 159. Id. at 320. 
 160. Id. at 312-16. 
 161. Id. at 288-90. 
 162. Id. at 363-68. 
 163. Id. at 359-62.  
 164. Id. at 290, 320.   
 165. See id. at 318. 
 166. See id. at 314-15. 
 167. See Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection Analy-
sis, 6 AM. U. J. OF GENDER & THE L. 43 (1998). 
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definition of “diversity.”
168
  While a holistic definition of diversity includes 
racial diversity, diversity is different from, albeit related to, equality.  This 
shift in focus confuses the significance of the difference between the Individ-
ual Equality Principle and the Group Equality Principle even as it simultane-
ously acknowledges the importance of each.  In the affirmative action con-
text, the Individual Equality Principle is affirmed because each individual is 
entitled to equal protection.  Typically, the plaintiff in such cases is white.  
On the other hand, the Group Equality Principle is affirmed because the Court 
held that admitting a diverse class, including a racially diverse class, is a 
compelling state interest.  Typically, racial diversity is achieved when racial 
minorities are included in a predominantly white class.    
Both Equality Principles, however, are overshadowed by the very con-
cept of diversity.  This is because most characteristics of an individual, as 
valuable as they are and as much as they contribute to diversity, have nothing 
to do with equality.  Consider talent; undoubtedly, the talents that applicants 
bring to the university enrich the school’s environment.  If a college wants an 
athletics program, it has to admit applicants who play sports.  Accordingly, it 
is easy to see the link between talent and diversity; however, that does not 
mean that there is a constitutional link.  The most talented football player 
does not have a claim of talent discrimination if he is denied admission to a 
public university while an applicant with no football talent is admitted.  This 
is true even if the university sets aside a certain number of seats and scholar-
ships for applicants who do not play football. 
An applicant from State A who is denied admission to Public University 
C when an applicant from State B is admitted would similarly not have          
a geographic discrimination suit even if the applicant from State A was clear-
ly “more qualified” according to the University’s admissions metrics.  Signif-
icantly, though geographic identity is constitutionally important, and in this 
way is more like race than talent, it is not constitutionally protected.  Recall 
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter in which she linked geographic and 
racial identity and opined that both are important and shape an individual’s 
views
169
 – once the focus shifts from equality to diversity, however, anything 
that makes an individual unique can be thrown into the diversity melting pot.  
The Equality Principles remind us, however, that no matter what identity 
traits might go into that pot, “racial identity” clearly cannot be taken out of it.  
Unfortunately, there is a huge negative consequence that results from 
this shift – the increased commodification of racial identity.  Professor Nancy 
Leong’s recent article entitled “Racial Capitalism”
170
 explains that valuing 
  
 168. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307-09 (2003). 
 169. Id. at 333. 
 170. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).  Prof. 
Leong states, “In a society preoccupied with diversity, nonwhiteness is a valued 
commodity.  And where that society is founded on capitalism, it is unsurprising that 
the commodity of nonwhiteness is exploited for its market value.”  Id. at 2154; see 
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diversity just for the sake of increasing the number of racial minorities in a 
white institution privileges whites.
171
  For example, it allows white institu-
tions to hold themselves out as non-racist.
172
  Furthermore, the justifications 
for this shift suggest that the inclusion of racial minorities in white class-
rooms is to benefit white students who “need” to learn about racial differ-
ences to enhance their own chances for success in the real world.
173
  I agree 
with Professor Leong that the current understanding by most whites and 
white institutions that diversity is valuable is somewhat superficial.
174
  If 
equality were truly the reason for valuing diversity, then institutions would 
work hard to change their cultures.
175
  Because diversity has become so prev-
alent, however, the discourse is unlikely to shift back to equality.  It is criti-
cally important, however, to remember and to stress that racial diversity is 
firmly rooted in the Equality Principles.  It is from this perspective that I sug-
gest that the reasoning of Grutter is premised on having the experiential bias 
of all students, including racial minority students, engaged in classroom dis-
cussions consistent with the Group Equality Principle.   
This Article suggests that federalism insists that, like racial identity, ge-
ographic identity cannot be taken out of the melting pot with respect to the 
Article III judiciary and its role in protecting the equality of states as well as 
the Equality Principles.  
C.  Lesson Three: Individual and Group Identity Inform                  
Experiential Biases 
An individual’s experiences relate not just to what the individual experi-
ences as an individual, but also to what he or she experiences as a member of 
various groups.  The concepts of individual identity and group identity are 
both related and distinct.  The Individual Equality Principle and the Group 
Equality Principle highlight the importance of this distinction.  
Mediating the distinction between individual and group identity is chal-
lenging, because it is human nature to group people – to stereotype or “essen-
tialize” them – based on their shared identity traits.  But stereotyping is un-
fair.  It is common knowledge, for example, that Justice Thomas is criticized 
by people who assert that he does not “think like a black man” because of his 
  
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale 
on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 171. Leong, supra note 170 at 2155. 
 172. Id. at 2179. 
 173. See id.  
 174. Id. at 2169-70.  This is what Prof. Leong calls the “thin” version of diversity, 
distinguishing it from the “thick” version which “views diversity as a prerequisite to 
cross-racial interaction, which fosters inclusivity and improves cross-racial relation-
ships, thereby benefiting institutions and individuals of all races.”  Id. at 2169. 
 175. See id. at 2170-71. 
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conservative views.
176
  This criticism, of course, essentializes all blacks and 
assigns each a single voice that speaks the “black view.”  This is ridiculously 
unfair on the individual level because each individual’s experiential bias is 
unique to that individual’s life experiences.  Even identical twins, raised in 
the same environment, are still independent thinkers.
177
  It is fundamentally 
unfair to expect them to be of the same mind as if they were one person. 
Simultaneously, group membership is relevant to the influences of expe-
riential bias because an individual’s group membership has a powerful influ-
ence on the individual’s life experiences.  A black man, for example, has a far 
greater chance of being stopped by the police than a white woman.  In the 
aftermath of the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, Presi-
dent Obama shared on national television that he had been the target of racial 
profiling and even commented that “Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 
years ago.”
178
  Parents of white children do not have to confront the unfair 
reality of racial profiling.  This reality, although unfair, says nothing about 
how an individual black man who is pulled over would vote for a political 
candidate or evaluate a legal problem.  This also helps in understanding why 
it is important to have a “critical mass” of racial minorities in a classroom.  
While each individual’s experiences are unique to the individual, group 
members share a common bond about what it means to be a member of that 
group.  Notwithstanding his conservative views that do not align with majori-
ty black politics, Justice Thomas emphatically claimed his black identity in 
Grutter when he quoted Frederick Douglass’ plea to abolitionists to leave 
blacks alone and let them stand on their own achievements.
179
 
  
 176. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The “Transformative Racial Politics” of Justice 
Thomas?: The Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 787 (2005). 
 177. See James. M. Olson, Philip A. Vernon, Julie Aitken Harris & Kerry L.  
Jang, The Heritability of Attitudes: A Study of Twins, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY &    
SOC. PSYCH. 845, 859 (2001) (“Attitudes are learned. But attitudes also depend on 
biological factors.”). 
 178. Michael Winerip, President Obama, Race and the Ku Klux Klan, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/booming/president-
obama-race-and-the-ku-klux-klan.html?_r=0.   
 179. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part).  Frederick Douglass’ speech: 
“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I 
perceive, than just, manifested toward us.  What I ask for the negro is not be-
nevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.  The American people 
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us . . . .  I have had 
but one answer from the beginning.  Do nothing with us!  Your doing with us 
has already played the mischief with us.  Do nothing with us!  If the apples 
will not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the 
core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! . . . And if the ne-
gro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also.  All I ask is, give him a 
chance to stand on his own legs!  Let him alone! . . . ”   
Id.  
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Thus, experiential bias acknowledges that an individual can belong to    
a particular group but still hold views that are out of sync with those of       
the group.  The Grutter Court’s broad definition of “diversity” that includes 
identity traits that clearly are not constitutionally protected acknowledges  
that a person’s identity – in a holistic sense – is based on myriad factors,  
including race.
180
 
D.  Lesson Four: Grutter and Fisher Are Federalism Cases, Too 
Significantly, Grutter actually is a federalism case because the Court did 
not hold that states must consider race in their public university admis-
sions.
181
  Consistent with federalism and the individuality of states, the Court 
left it to the states to decide whether they want to consider race in their public 
university admissions.
182
  If a state chooses to consider race, then it must 
make race only one factor among many, consistent with the Individual Equal-
ity Principle.
183
  Ultimately, though, the choice to be or not to be an “affirma-
tive action” state is made by the state and becomes part of its identity.  Thus, 
connecting equality and diversity with federalism is fairly easy. 
Seeing how geographic identity is tied in to the mix is fuzzier.  Clarity is 
added by understanding that, although the link between geographic identity 
and equality is relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not actually 
derive from it.  Rather, the link originates from federalism principles that are 
reflected in Article III.  For example, Article III links state sovereignty with a 
criminal defendant’s equality by requiring that criminal trials be heard in the 
state where the crime was committed.
184
  Jury selection in criminal trials also 
links geography, federalism, and equality by limiting the selection to certain 
geographic areas.
185
  In turn, Article III judges, through their experiential 
biases, protect the Equality Principles. 
E.  Lesson Five: Diversity Helps to “Unlearn Prejudice” 
It is an individual’s life experiences, which are shaped by race, sex, sex-
ual orientation, religion, geography, talent, and so forth, that enrich the class-
room experience for all students.  In other words, the Grutter Court held that 
states are allowed to value – that is, have a compelling interest in – the reality 
  
 180. See id. at 338-39. 
 181. See id. at 343. 
 182. See id.; Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 
(2014) (holding that a state constitutional amendment to ban the use of race in state 
university admissions is constitutional because without a constitutional violation, 
neither the U.S. Constitution nor precedent provided any basis on which a federal 
court could overturn a state’s law). 
 183. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38. 
 184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 3. 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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that a person’s race (and other identity traits) affects the way in which he or 
she experiences the world, and that sharing those experiences in an educa-
tional setting enriches the learning environment.
186
  Again, I emphasize that 
diversity is about equality. 
Moreover, building on Gordon Allport’s pioneering work on prejudice, 
studies repeatedly show that one of the best ways for anyone, particularly 
children, to avoid learning prejudice toward particular groups is to interact 
with those groups.
187
  His conclusions are worth noting: 
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the indi-
vidual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and 
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals.  The effect is greatly 
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by 
law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that 
leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity 
between members of the two groups.
188
 
Recent studies also indicate that even “indirect” or “imaginary” contact is 
helpful to promote healthy race relations.
189
  For example, if one person in a 
group befriends a person from an out-group, other members of the in-group 
have increased positive attitudes about the out-group.
190
  “Whereas positive 
direct intergroup contact can transform the participating individuals’ atti-
tudes, one in-group member’s friendship with an out-group member can have 
a cascading and almost viral influence as other in-group members learn of 
this friendship (or experience contact indirectly).”
191
  Significantly, though, 
this observation means that at least one person from the in-group has to have 
direct contact with a member of the out-group for an “indirect” effect.
192
  
Alternatively, for someone to imagine having a positive relationship with 
someone from an out-group, the person must have positive visions, through 
media or other means, of interracial relationships.
193
  
  
 186. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
 187. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (25th 
anniversary ed. 1979).  
 188. Id. at 281. 
 189. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, Anja Eller, & Miles Hewstone, Improving Inter-
group Relations Through Direct, Extended and Other Forms of Indirect Contact, 14 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 147, 148 (2011). 
 190. Id. at 150. 
 191. Id. at 148; see also Thomas F. Pettigrew, Linda R. Tropp, Ulrich Wagner & 
Oliver Christ, Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory, 35 INT’L. J. OF 
INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS 271, 277 (2011).  
 192. See Dovidio, supra note 189, at 148. 
 193. Id. at 158. 
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A primary goal of Brown v. Board of Education was to integrate the 
public schools as part of the struggle to achieve racial equality.
194
  Allport’s 
studies fully support those efforts by suggesting that: 
[T]o perceive the real problems in race relations for what they are 
marks a distinct gain.  While they are difficult to solve, they stand a 
better chance of being solved if the irrelevancies of stereotype and au-
tistic hostility are first eliminated.  And to achieve this gain the aboli-
tion of segregation helps greatly.
195
  
Racially integrated schools allow children to step up to, and even cross over, 
the color line, and studies like those of Allport show that this is one of the 
best ways for them to learn how to navigate it.  Arms-length or abstract inter-
racial lessons allow unconscious (or conscious) biases to fester.  As Professor 
Nienke Grossman said, “[t]he mere presence of excluded groups can counter-
act both actual bias and perceptions of bias.”
196
  Certainly, to the extent we 
continue to allow our public schools to be largely segregated and woefully 
unequal, we condone the message to our children that racial and economic 
inequality are not important enough to fix.  The burdens of this message fall 
disproportionately on children of color.  This is a resounding message about 
racial inferiority and superiority, a lesson that presumably loving adults and 
equality-minded people would never explicitly condone.
197
 
Moreover, learning how to manage and develop healthy race relations is 
a sign of high emotional intelligence.
198
  In reality, children of color have a 
head start on most white children in understanding race relations because they 
are forced to navigate the color line every day of their lives.  Many white 
children do not even have to think of race because their whiteness is like the 
invisibility cloak in Harry Potter
199
 and hides them from the daily racial strife.  
Yet every loving parent wants his or her child to have high emotional intelli-
gence because it is key to effective leadership.  Some journalists have written 
  
 194. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 195. Allport, supra note 187, at 274.  
 196. Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legit-
imacy of the International Court?, 12 CHI. J. I. L. 647, 665 (2012).  
 197. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of     
Children: The Importance of Integrated Schools, 20 TEMPLE POL. & CIVIL RTS. L. 
REV. 71 (2010).  
 198. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT 
CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ (10th anniversary ed. 1995); see also Sharon E. Rush, 
The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 1, 5 (1997). 
 199. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 201 (1999). 
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about President Obama’s high emotional intelligence,
200
 which is not surpris-
ing precisely because he has had to mediate the color line throughout his po-
litical career.  In contrast, as smart and successful as Governor Romney is, 
according to political analysts his presidential campaign failed, at least in 
part, because he and his advisors did not understand critical aspects of the 
power dynamic between historically privileged groups and racial minorities, 
immigrants, and even women.
201
  It is hard to unlearn prejudice or unfair bias, 
especially for equality-minded people who often do not fully understand how 
their thinking about other people can be unreasonable.  Certainly, diverse 
(integrated) classrooms offer hope that the next generation will have healthier 
and more equal relationships because they will have learned what respect for 
others truly means: a shared human dignity. 
F.  Lesson Six: The Holding in Fisher Is Irrelevant to Diversity Goals 
This analysis does not change because of the Fisher Court’s decision.  
The Fisher Court could have ruled for or against Fisher on the facts and kept 
the basic holding of Grutter intact, or it could have held that the Constitution 
prohibits states from considering race in their public university admissions 
processes.  An affirmation of Grutter reinforces, from the Constitution’s per-
spective, the reality that group racial identity – the Group Equality Principle – 
is at the heart of diversity in public education.  Moreover, it also reinforces 
the importance of federalism and state sovereignty because each state may 
choose whether or not to consider race in university admissions.
202
   
But even if the Fisher Court had overruled Grutter and held that race 
cannot be considered in public university admissions processes, it would not 
mean that individual racial identity is no longer protected under the Constitu-
tion.  The Individual Equality Principle would survive, in that it still would be 
unconstitutional to discriminate on account of race.  Indeed, Fisher’s suit was 
brought under a claim of racial discrimination through the current admissions 
policy, and probably would have been the Court’s rationale for overruling 
Grutter if it had done so; to consider race in state university admissions even 
as one factor among many would be race discrimination.  No state, then, 
would be able to identify as an “affirmative action” state as that phrase is 
commonly understood. 
But what would overruling Grutter do to the Group Equality Principle 
and federalism?  Importantly, even if the Fisher Court had denied states the 
choice to consider race in their public school admissions processes, it is un-
  
 200. See, e.g., Chris Bolis, The Emotional Intelligence of President Obama, CBS 
MONEY WATCH (May 13, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
505125_162-31147537/the-emotional-intelligence-of-president-obama/. 
 201. See, e.g., Hope Over Experience: A Divided Country Gives Obama a Second 
Chance, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204349404578102971575770036. 
 202. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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likely that diversity, including racial diversity, would have become irrelevant 
to public institutions.
203
  It is worth emphasizing that the underlying rationale 
for the Grutter Court’s decision is that a racially diverse class enriches the 
learning environment, in that students can share experiences gained from 
their racial identities.
204
  Every student in the classroom has experiential bias 
based on race and myriad other factors.  
Naturally, classrooms have always been filled with students who have 
unique experiences to share with each other.  Grutter’s focus on including the 
experiences of racial minorities simply highlights the need, in a democracy 
that values equality and representation, to acknowledge that the experiential 
biases of these minorities are just as valuable as those of other students – 
including white students – in enriching the learning environment.  Grutter 
exposes this history and the hidden assumption behind excluding racial mi-
norities from certain public universities: that only white students’ experiences 
have ever mattered.  
Moreover, just as experiential bias has always formed the basis of       
the classroom learning environment, the importance of including the experi-
ences of racial minorities (and thus striving to meet the Group Equality Prin-
ciple) will not evaporate if Grutter is overruled, as it probably will be some-
day.  State universities understand this reality.  While a future Court might 
make it unconstitutional for a state to hold itself out or identify itself as an 
“affirmative action” state, all states have chosen to identify as “diversity” 
states.  My research efforts did not find one state, through its public universi-
ty or college websites, that did not value diversity.  Indeed, go to any public 
college or university website and inevitably it will hold itself out as an institu-
tion that seeks a diverse student body.  In fact, the University of Wisconsin-
Madison recently admitted that it altered a photo to include racial minorities 
for the sole purpose of holding itself out as an institution that values racial 
diversity.
205
  While a future Court decision might present challenges to the 
way in which diversity, especially racial diversity, is achieved, achieving 
diversity – or meeting the Group Equality Principle – is ostensibly a priority 
for all state universities.  Moreover, because the racial demographics in the 
United States are becoming more and more diverse, it is unlikely that diversi-
ty will become less important. 
Valuing diversity is a reasonable, sound, and realistic choice.  As Pro-
fessor Leong details in her recent article, however, diversity must be valued 
  
 203. See Leong, supra note 170, at 2166. (society has accepted diversity for so 
long now that it is “beyond the legal realm”).  
 204. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 205. See Lisa Wade, Doctoring Diversity: Race and Photoshop, THE SOCIETY 
PAGES (Sept. 2, 2009, 10:48 AM), http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2009/ 
09/02/doctoring-diversity-race-and-photoshop/ (University of Wisconsin photo-
shopped picture of an African American male into football game crowd and used in 
its admissions booklets).  
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for the right reasons and not just for the sake of appearing non-racist.
206
  And, 
because public institutions can choose to be diverse, their decisions support 
federalism.  Studies show that many, if not most, environments, particularly 
those that provide services to the public, strive to be diverse.  The military is 
a leader in understanding the importance of diversity, and Congress recently 
created “The Military Leadership Diversity Commission” to try to increase 
diversity at the more senior levels.
207
  Businesses want diverse workforces, 
and a recent McKinsey report shows why: “U.S. companies with the highest 
executive-board diversity had returns on equity 95 percent higher and earn-
ings margins 58 percent higher, on average, than those with the least execu-
tive diversity.”
208
  Public schools at all levels also want diverse student bod-
ies.  In fact, some schools wanted it badly enough that they used voluntary 
integration plans to try to achieve it; however, the use of such plans was 
struck down by the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School District No. 1.
209
  Even “non-affirmative action” states – those 
states where citizens have already exercised their sovereignty to prohibit the 
use of race in admissions – want their public institutions to be diverse and go 
to enormous efforts and expense to meet their goals.
210
  If diversity is not 
  
 206. Leong, supra note 170, at 2155. 
 207. Lisa Daniel, Panel Recommends Ways to Improve Military Diversity, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle. 
aspx?ID=63065.  
 208. Karen E. Klein, How ‘Diversity Fatigue’ Undermines Business Growth, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, SMALL BUSINESS (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-14/how-diversity-fatigue-undermines  
-business-growth.  
 209. 551 U.S. 701, 709 (2007).   
 210. The University of Florida is an excellent example.  Florida operates under 
“One Florida,” an executive order by Governor Jeb Bush and approved by the legisla-
ture that prohibits the use of race in public university admissions since 2000.  See 
Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/04/us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmative-
action.html.   Nevertheless, diversity is extremely important to the University.  It has 
a Multicultural & Diversity Affairs office and a Council on Diversity.  Multicultural 
& Diversity Affairs, UNIV. OF FLA. DIV. OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, http://www.multi-
cultural.ufl.edu/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); President’s Council on Diversity, UNIV. 
OF FLA. HUMAN RES. SERVS., http://hr.ufl.edu/manager-resources/recruitment-
staffing/institutional-equity-diversity/presidents-council-on-diversity/ (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2014).  Although race cannot be considered in the admissions process, suc-
cessful recruitment of minorities depends, to some extent, on the University being a 
diverse environment so that prospective students, staff, and faculty want to come to 
the University.  See Leong, supra note 170 at 2184.  That is consistent with Prof. 
Leong’s thin understanding of diversity.  See id. at 2169-70.  But the University val-
ues diversity in a much more substantive way also, and has implemented meaningful 
laws, rules and regulations to create an environment that is equal for everyone.  Mul-
ticultural & Diversity Affairs, UNIV. OF FLA. DIV. OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, http://www. 
multicultural.ufl.edu/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  For a southern state university, this 
 
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on:  6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
156 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
going to be associated with racial equality principles under the Constitution, 
as a society we nevertheless seem to operate on the premise articulated by the 
Grutter Court that “[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and eth-
nic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Na-
tion, indivisible, is to be realized.”
211
  Certainly, diversity as a holistic con-
cept, where race is only one part, seems to be here to stay.  Leaders who ex-
ercise good business and democratic judgment support diversity. 
G.  Lesson Seven: This All Relates to the Article III Judiciary 
The effective leader who supports diversity understands that diversity is 
about representation and legitimacy.  A business that employs no women can 
say that it does not discriminate on the basis of sex, but it would be hard to 
believe such a claim.  Even if such a business did not discriminate, it would 
appear to discriminate.  And geographic identity matters in this regard, too.  
Imagine how valid it would be to question the legitimacy of an international 
court if all of the judges on the court were from the same country.
212
  Even if 
the judges were impartial, they would appear unfairly biased because the 
views of judges from other countries would be excluded.
213
  To have legiti-
macy as an international court, the judges must be representative of the inter-
national community and come from different countries precisely because of 
their experiential diversity.  Similarly, in order to have legitimacy, the experi-
ential biases that attach to judges because of their geographic identity (and 
other identity traits) must be equally represented on the Article III bench.    
So it is with states and Article III courts in the United States.  Professor 
Sherrilyn Ifill pointed out that a circuit court of appeals would appear unfairly 
biased if it was comprised of judges from only one state, because the other 
states in the circuit would be unrepresented on the bench.
214
  This Article 
extends this concept – because each state is independently sovereign and has 
its own identity, the absence of a state resident as an Article III judge on the 
appellate bench unconstitutionally excludes that state’s right to bring its expe-
riential and fair state-identity bias to the decision-making process.  Congress 
recognized this and therefore requires by law that each state have a minimum 
of one resident on each of the circuit courts of appeal.
215
  
  
change in culture has been slow, but it is changing.  See Leong, supra note 170,         
at 2195-96. 
 211. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
 212. See Grossman, supra note 196, at 668. 
 213. Id.  
 214. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 45, 47 (2009). 
 215. 28 U.S.C. §44(c) (2012) (“In each circuit (other than the Federal judicial 
circuit) there shall be at least one circuit judge in regular active service appointed 
from the residents of each state in that circuit.”). 
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Presidents and citizens want diverse Article III courts – diverse in a    
holistic and experiential sense.
216
  The structure of the Article III system at 
the lower court levels adds legitimacy to the Article III judiciary because     
all of the states are represented in the system.  Substantively, federal judges 
who are citizens of the states in which they sit also bring their “local spirits” 
to the federal bench; this is not a matter of unfair prejudice, but rather a mat-
ter of identity shaped by experiences and associated pride.  A judge’s geo-
graphic identity adds federalism value to the bench, and because the nation is 
comprised of fifty states, each of those geographic identities belongs on the 
federal bench.   
V.  BIAS AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
A.  Diversity Jurisdiction 
The reality of the potential for unfair local bias – conscious or uncon-
scious, and however remote – offers some support for diversity jurisdiction.  
When Alexander Hamilton expressed his concern that the “local spirit(s)” 
might unduly influence state judges to favor their states over the federal gov-
ernment,
217
 he might have been expressing a concern about conscious or un-
conscious unfair bias.  In any event, the idea behind diversity jurisdiction is 
that a state judge will identify with a litigant from their state such that their 
shared geographic identity creates an “us versus them” dichotomy within the 
lawsuit.  The shared geographic identity between the judge and local resident, 
so the theory goes, binds them so strongly that it is assumed the judge “will 
find a way,” perhaps unwittingly, to rule in favor of the resident.  The Article 
III provision for diversity jurisdiction in federal court provides an out-of-state 
litigant with a way to avoid this risk.  Thus, Congress’ unwillingness to abol-
ish diversity jurisdiction is defensible if the potential for unfair bias exists.  
An Article III judge would be impartial – at least theoretically.  
Significantly, Article III judges, with a few exceptions, are required by 
Congress to be residents of the states wherein they preside;
218
 thus, they also 
  
 216. See generally Ifill, supra note 214 (stating that diversity in a holistic sense, 
including racial, gender and geographic, enhances the legitimacy of the Court). 
 217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 544 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1898); see Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54. 
 218. For court of appeals judges, see 28 U.S.C. §44(c) (2012) (“Except in        the 
District of Columbia, each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for which 
appointed at the time of his appointment and thereafter while in active service.”).    
For district court judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (2012) (“Each district judge, except 
in the District of Columbia, the Southern District of New York, and the Eastern   
District of New York, shall reside in the district or one of the districts for which he    
is appointed.  Each district judge of the Southern District of New York and the East-
ern District of New York may reside within 20 miles of the district to which he or   
she is appointed.”).  
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share a geographic identity with the plaintiff and presumably have the poten-
tial to be just as unfairly biased as state judges.
219
  Theoretically, the shield 
that guards against unfair bias stemming from shared geographic identities is 
the fact that the Article III judge is not elected and also enjoys life tenure and 
salary protection.  Admittedly, an Article III judge has no motivation to rule 
for the local resident in order to curry favorable support in the next election.  
But neither did most state judges at the time because they enjoyed similar 
metrics of judicial independence.
220
  
B.  Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Ironically, some of the best evidence of the importance of states’ voices 
in the national government comes from highlighting a few points about con-
current federal question (general arising under) jurisdiction.  Initially, Con-
gress did not extend federal question jurisdiction to federal courts because of 
both a fear of putting too much power in the national government, and for 
reasons of expense.
221
  Interestingly, though, there seemed to be an under-
standing that state court judges were capable of deciding federal question 
cases.
222
  The best evidence of this lies in the Madisonian Compromise be-
tween the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists – an agreement, reflected in 
Article III, to establish one Supreme Court and otherwise give Congress dis-
cretion to create lower federal courts.
223
  Obviously, in the absence of lower 
federal courts, the presumption was that federal question cases would be 
heard in state courts.
224
  Alexander Hamilton also espoused his view that 
states should enjoy concurrent federal question jurisdiction.
225
 
For about one year, from 1801 to 1802, Congress did grant federal 
courts jurisdiction over federal question cases;
226
 it was not until 1875 that 
Congress made federal question jurisdiction concurrent.
227
  Congress also was 
motivated to give federal courts federal question jurisdiction at the time be-
cause it believed that states would be biased against federal claims.
228
  But 
  
 219. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1847-48. 
 220. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.   
 221. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 890.  
 222. See id.  
 223. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1825. 
 224. Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the 
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. 
PA. L. REV. 45, 47, 55 (1975). 
 225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 226. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (creating arising under 
jurisdiction), repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.   
 227. 28 USC § 1331 (2012); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740,  
745 (2012) (noting that federal courts have possessed federal question jurisdiction 
since 1875). 
 228. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 102-06.   
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Congress’ timing, of course, was not a coincidence.  The Civil War had just 
ended, the Reconstruction Amendments were added to the Constitution, and 
there was concern regarding whether the newly-freed slaves would receive 
justice in some states’ courts as they exercised their new constitutional 
rights.
229
  After all, the geography of slavery had significantly impacted not 
just states’ identities, but individuals’ identities as well.  Enslaved blacks, 
legally classified as property, were confined to certain spaces and largely kept 
out of the public spaces that were reserved for whites.  When a slave was able 
to cross geographic boundaries into a “free” state or territory, the Supreme 
Court upheld the master’s right to return the slave to the master’s home.
230
  
While the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, change inevitably took 
time.  Remarkably, progress toward full racial equality was significantly hin-
dered following the Civil War.  Under the disingenuous rubric of “separate 
but equal,” state Jim Crow laws continued to maintain the geographic spaces 
that defined race relations – the color line – by mandating the public segrega-
tion of people based on race.
231
  The privilege of simply being in public spac-
es seemed indelibly etched into whiteness.
232
  
Interestingly, by 1875, most state judges had lost the metrics of judicial 
independence they shared with Article III judges and became elected or ap-
pointed.
233
  In light of the Jim Crow laws in many states, and given the need 
  
 229. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1827.  
 230. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1842). 
 231. See Sharon E. Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1999). 
 232. For some people, that impression lingers.  For example, the controversy 
surrounding what happened to Trayvon Martin and the question about whether he 
“belonged” in the neighborhood that night – racial territoriality – exemplifies how the 
color-line continues to divide people. See Dan Barry et al., Race, Tragedy and Out-
rage Collide After a Shot in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-prompts-a-review-
of-ideals.html?.  How confusing is race and how confused are we as a society, gener-
ally, about race?  Consider that the attorneys in the case reassured the jury that the 
case was not about race.  See, e.g., Lisa Lucas & Corky Siemaszko, Trayvon Martin 
Trial: After Prosecution Witness Grilled over ‘Cracker’ Comment, Martin Family 
Lawyer Says Trial Not About Race, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28, 2013, 5:02 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/trayvon-martin-trial-prosecution-star-
witness-grilled-article-1.1384074.  But all of the media attention about the case fo-
cused on virtually nothing but race, and, ironically, on the question whether or not it 
really was about race.  A Pew Research Study found that eighty-six percent of blacks, 
but only thirty percent of whites, were dissatisfied with the Zimmerman verdict.  See 
Big Racial Divide over Zimmerman Verdict: Whites Say Too Much Focus on Race, 
Blacks Disagree, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/22/big-racial-divide-over-zimmerman-verdict/.  
The study also found that seventy-eight percent of blacks and twenty-eight percent of 
whites believed the case raised important issues about race.  Id.  
 233. Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 842.  
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of state judges to be re-elected or re-appointed, the continuing impartiality of 
Article III judges meant that they could be trusted, at least compared to state 
judges, with protecting the newly-freed slaves’ individual rights.  Federal 
question jurisdiction provided them a pathway to federal court.  
From the federalism perspective, the significance of Congress making 
general federal question jurisdiction concurrent with state jurisdiction –     
and not exclusively federal – cannot be overstated.  Consistent with this Arti-
cle’s theme, although saved for another day, states arguably have a right to 
hear federal question cases and Congress would not have the authority to 
make it exclusively federal.
234
  In reality, though, this is unlikely to be an 
issue because engaging in constitutional interpretation is one of the most 
powerful ways for a state to participate in the national government.  No state 
has declined to participate in this enterprise by refusing to exercise federal 
question jurisdiction.  
This is different from saying that Congress has the constitutional power 
to make states hear federal question cases.  Consistent with federalism and 
the Court’s recent reliance on the anti-commandeering principle,
235
 it is rea-
sonable to question whether Congress has the constitutional authority to make 
states hear all federal question cases.  In its 1947 decision Testa v. Katt, the 
Court held that states must hear federal claims when states provide for review 
of similar types of cases under their own laws.
236
  But, again, the question is 
largely theoretical with respect to federal question cases that raise constitu-
tional issues.
237
  By making general federal question jurisdiction concurrent 
  
 234. Alexander Hamilton opined that federal and state courts would enjoy concur-
rent jurisdiction over federal claims absent special circumstances that would warrant 
making jurisdiction exclusively federal.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander 
Hamilton); see also Purcell, supra note 38, at 692 n.43.  
 235. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 935 (1997) (holding that 
Congress lacks authority to make states participate in administering background 
checks on gun purchases under federal regulatory law); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress lacks authority to make states “take 
title” to radioactive waste under federal regulatory scheme).  
 236. 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).  Testa is often cited as the case that establishes the 
principle that states have a duty to hear federal cases.  See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 
928; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 
GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2006).  But in Testa, the underlying issue involved a federal 
statute, the Emergency Price Control Act, and Rhode Island provided for state court 
review of similar issues.  Testa, 330 U.S. at 387-88.  It also has surfaced in section 
1983 cases, and in cases under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.  See Howlett v. 
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1990); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and 
State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006).  Moreover, the recent decisions in 
Printz and New York cause some scholars to question whether the federal government 
can make states hear federal cases.  See Bellia, supra; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 216-218 (5th ed. 2007). 
 237. The difference between statutory and constitutional cases is significant.  
Presumably, states want to participate in constitutional interpretation, but they might 
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with states, Congress reinforced the importance of states in our system of 
government.  What better way to demonstrate the importance and uniqueness 
of each state than to continue to have them share responsibility with Article 
III courts for interpreting federal law, including the Constitution, even though 
the basic premise underlying the enactment of federal question jurisdiction 
was to avoid unfair state court bias against federal claims.
238
  Certainly, when 
Congress provided for general arising under jurisdiction and did not cut out 
state courts (even if it was a matter of efficiency and a practical need to have 
state courts hear federal claims), it allowed state court judges – even ones 
thought to be unfairly biased by the “local spirit” – to participate in deciding 
the meaning of federal law, including the Constitution.  Naturally, state courts 
adjudicating federal claims were, and still are, bound by the Constitution to 
respect the supremacy of federal law.  Any mistakes made by lower court 
judges, state or federal, are amenable to correction by the Supreme Court.  
Moreover, from the beginning, the judicial system relied on state    
courts to hear federal claims knowing that state court judges would reach 
different conclusions in their interpretations of federal law.  In fact, providing 
for “uniformity” in federal law is often cited as a core reason for extending 
federal question jurisdiction to federal courts.
239
  Time has shown that         
the goal of achieving uniformity, however, has been elusive.
240
  Even if    
concurrent arising under jurisdiction is not constitutionally compelled, as I 
believe it is, a divergence among judges – state and federal – as to the mean-
ing of federal law has always existed and has come to be an acceptable part of 
our democracy.  Stated alternatively, the diversity among the different state 
judges’ voices is an integral part of federalism because each state is an inde-
pendent sovereign.  
The Supreme Court naturally has the authority to review state court de-
cisions to clarify the meaning of federal law and to ensure its supremacy, but 
that authority is largely discretionary under the Court’s certiorari process.  
The Court, particularly under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and continuing 
through Chief Justice Roberts, has been extremely interested in granting cer-
tiorari in cases that raise a wide spectrum of federalism issues.
241
  While 
states do not win all the time,
242
 the Court has protected state sovereignty 
  
have less incentive to participate in the interpretation of federal statutes, unless the 
statue has a direct effect on the state.  For example, a state presumably would be in-
terested in interpreting immigration federal statutes, but might have less interest in 
hearing individual employment discrimination cases under Title VII under FELA.  
See Bellia, supra note 236.  
 238. See supra Part II.B. 
 239. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 97.  
 240. Id. 
 241. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, What Federalism & Why? Science Versus Doctrine, 
35 PEPP. L. REV. 47, 52, 57 (2007). 
 242. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2534 (2012) (holding 
that Congress’ power to regulate immigration preempted conflicting state laws); Nat’l 
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under various parts of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause
243
 
and the Tenth,
244
 Eleventh
245
 and Fourteenth Amendments.
246
  It also has 
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, otherwise known as the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, in ways that make it increasingly difficult for individuals to seek re-
dress for violations of their individual liberties by states.
247
   
In the larger scheme, though, the Court reviews less than ten percent of 
the cases that seek review.
248
  Consequently, many state court decisions are 
the final word in a particular case.  When the Supreme Court does review a 
state court’s decision, it benefits from the legal reasoning of different state, 
and perhaps federal, judges who decided similar cases.  A primary reason for 
granting certiorari in a given case might be because there are conflicting deci-
sions among lower courts – state or federal.  In the final analysis, it might be 
a state court’s reasoning that is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
249
 
  
Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding that Congress 
lacks Commerce Clause power to make states participate in Medicaid expansion or 
lose all of their federal funding for Medicaid); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 
(2005) (holding that Congress has the Commerce Clause power to criminalize the 
possession of medical marijuana even though California did not make it a state 
crime); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a state law crimi-
nalizing homosexual sodomy is an unconstitutional violation of privacy under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that 
Colorado’s amendment to its state constitution prohibiting gays from seeking equal 
protection of the laws is unconstitutional). 
 243. Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress 
lacks Commerce Clause power to criminalize the possession of a gun within 1000 feet 
of a school).  
 244. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks pow-
er to abrogate state’s sovereign immunity in state court); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks Commerce Clause power to com-
mandeer states into federal regulatory program).  
 245. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Con-
gress lacks Commerce Clause power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity pro-
tected under the
 
Eleventh Amendment).  But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by Congress’ enforce-
ment power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 246. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress’ 
Section Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize it to 
create new rights). 
 247. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989) 
(noting that the state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983 because Con-
gress did not express a clear intent to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity). 
 248. See infra Part VII. 
 249. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (affirming 
state court decision upholding state law that created presumption of paternity in mari-
tal husband over biological father).   
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
2014] FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES 163 
C.  Geographic Identity of States 
The significant point, though, is that whether or not a judge enjoys judi-
cial independence, he or she nevertheless has a geographic identity.  That 
identity, grounded in federalism principles protected by the Constitution, can 
be enormously important in defining the relationship between federalism and 
Article III.  Professor Purcell describes this influence: 
Indeed, the fact that no federal judicial district crossed state lines gave 
the national courts an abiding state-specific identity, while the selec-
tion of area residents for federal judgeships and the influence of both 
local politics and senatorial courtesy on the appointment process rein-
forced the weight of local concerns among federal judges.  Local and 
regional values shaped the character of those appointed, and they 
shaped as well the character of the local bars and professional elites 
with whom those judges lived and worked.
250
     
Thus, the histories and traditions that shape a state’s identity belong just 
as much to an Article III judge sitting in a particular state as they do to a state 
judge.  Alexander Hamilton, expressing his fear that state judges might be 
biased against federal claims in state court, opined that “the prevalency of a 
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction 
of national causes”
251
  An Article III judge, like a state judge, “belongs to” 
the geographic state (or circuit) in which he or she sits.  Article III judges can 
claim their geographic areas (states or circuits) as their judicial territory and, 
correspondingly, citizens living in the geographic areas where the Article III 
judges sit can claim those judges as “their” judges.  Regardless of an individ-
ual Article III judge’s personality, the judge represents his or her state and, in 
essence, takes on the state’s identity as its Article III representative.  The 
experiences a judge has by virtue of belonging to a particular state shape the 
judge’s views and even their reality of the world.  In this way, Article III 
judges are representatives of the concept of state sovereignty.  
Even under the assumption that most judges avoid unfair conscious bias, 
a judge’s geographic identity nevertheless remains relevant because he or she 
will be experientially biased as a result of his or her geographic identity.  
Experiential bias is an inherent human trait and should not be conflated with 
unfair bias.  Just as experiences based on race or sex influence each person, 
the experiences a judge has because he or she is a citizen of a particular state 
inevitably influence his or her decision making.   
To summarize thus far, experiential bias suggests that people, including 
judges, make decisions that are not neutral, but which still can be fair and 
  
 250. Purcell, supra note 38, at 716-17. 
 251. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54 (emphasis added) (the quote continues, 
“and, not being employees of the federal government, might be more inclined to pro-
tect state interests over federal ones”). 
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based on the rule of law.  The more important point is that experiential bias is 
omnipresent; it cannot be avoided.  However, it also is not automatically un-
fair.  Focusing on judicial bias, one must consider that a judge can be con-
sciously or unconsciously biased, in a fair or unfair way.  Here, I am not talk-
ing about judges who should recuse themselves because of a conflict of inter-
est, or about the openly prejudiced judges who also should not be deciding 
cases that arouse their prejudices (if they should be judges at all).  Rather, I 
am focusing on the reasonable judge.  When a reasonable judge strays from 
reason and consciously rules in favor of one party without regard to legiti-
mate procedural rules or the merits of the case, the judge is knowingly biased 
in an unfair way.  For example, a judge who always rules in favor of a party 
just because the judge and the litigant have the same birthday is unfairly bi-
ased.  The next Part draws on identity scholarship to expose how the fear of 
unfair bias associated with geography is very similar to the fear of unfair bias 
associated with other identity traits, such as race.    
VI.  JUDGES AND IDENTITY: FROM FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO 
EQUALITY 
Ironically, accusations of unfair judicial bias stemming from a judge’s 
identity usually are not made until there is a shared identity connection be-
tween the judge and one of the litigants.
252
  This is at the heart of the reason 
for diversity jurisdiction.  Because the state judge and the local resident have 
a shared geographic identity – for example, State X – the judge is presumed 
to be biased in favor of Party X and against the other party from State Y.  The 
resulting teams consist of “us,” Judge X and local resident from State X, and 
“them,” people from State Y.   
This situation also arises when a judge and a litigant share other com-
mon identity traits. Significantly, though, it usually only arises when the 
judge is a member of a historically underrepresented group and shares an 
identity trait with one of the litigants.  Consider a case in which a woman 
accuses a man of sexual harassment.  The issue of unfair bias usually only 
arises if the case comes before a female judge.  Typically, the presumption is 
the female judge is unfairly biased in favor of the female plaintiff and against 
the male defendant.  The resulting teams consist of “us,” the female judge and 
female litigant, and “them,” men (particularly the male defendant). 
Identity scholarship exposes the hidden assumptions behind this concern 
because, of course, it is logical to assume that if a female judge were unfairly 
biased in favor of a female plaintiff, then a male judge would be unfairly  
biased in favor of a male defendant.  The latter possibility, of course, usually 
is not a concern because male judges are thought to be objective and neu-
  
 252. See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Should the Prop 8 Decision Be Over-
turned Because the Judge is Gay?, TIME, Apr. 26, 2011, http://content.time. 
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2067679,00.html. 
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tral.
253
  In the specific context of a sexual harassment suit, the source of the 
male judge’s neutrality is that he is not a woman and therefore can remain 
objective.  The parallels between the male judge’s perceived objectivity in the 
sexual harassment suit and that of an Article III judge in a diversity suit are 
readily apparent. 
This focus, like the focus on bias in diversity jurisdiction, in many ways 
misses the moral crux of the matter.
254
  Just as the Article III judge has a geo-
graphic identity, the male judge in the sexual harassment hypothetical, while 
not a woman, nevertheless has a sex and gender identity.  The female or the 
male judge might be unfairly biased, even unconsciously so.  In reality, 
though, they both will be experientially biased, because sex and gender have 
a profound effect on how women and men experience life.  Some might even 
argue that a woman would be a fairer judge in a sexual harassment case be-
cause her experiences as a woman would enable her to better understand the 
power dynamics that lie at the heart of sexual harassment.  Justice Sotomayor 
opined about the role of life experiences in judging before she was appointed 
to the Court: “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her 
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white 
male who hasn’t lived that life.”
255
  Reactions to Justice Sotomayor’s com-
ments, including her own explanation during her confirmation hearings in 
which she said that “she made a bad play on words,”
256
 highlight how com-
plicated identity “politics” can be.  
The sexual harassment hypothetical and Justice Sotomayor’s comment 
are consistent with the Group Equality Principle, which is premised on the 
idea that belonging to a historically-discriminated group influences how one 
perceives the world.  Regardless of where one might come out on that point, 
certainly, there is no basis to support an accusation that a female judge in a 
sexual harassment case would be unfairly experientially biased and that a 
male judge would be fairly experientially biased (which historically means 
not biased at all).  Today, through education and a growing awareness of ste-
reotypes, many people might presume that both the male and female judge 
  
 253. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 
832 (1990) (“[T]he theory of positionality offers the best explanatory grounding for 
feminist knowledge.  Positionality rejects both the objectivism of whole, fixed, impar-
tial truth and the relativism of different-but-equal truths.  It posits instead that being 
‘correct’ in law is a function of being situated in particular, partial perspectives upon 
which the individual is obligated to attempt to improve.”).  
 254. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE L.J. 1371, 1387 (1986). 
 255. Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html?_r=0. 
 256. High Marks for Sotomayor After Tough Questioning, CNNPOLITICS.COM 
(July 14, 2009, 8:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/14/soto-
mayor.hearing/. 
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on:  6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
166 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
will adjudicate the case fairly even though their gender differences shape how 
each of them views or understands the dynamics of sexual harassment.  
But the progress we have made in sex and gender equality is less evident 
in other areas wherein presumptions of unfair bias persist.  In fact, this was 
the focus of yet another case before the Court this term, Hollingsworth v. 
Perry.
257
  In Perry, Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California was accused of being unfairly biased when he 
ruled that California’s Proposition 8 (banning same-sex marriage) is unconsti-
tutional.
258
  His sexual orientation was never a public issue during the trial 
because he did not tell the public that he is gay.
259
  Once he announced that, 
however, some people called for his ruling to be voided, accusing him of 
unfair bias and claiming that he ruled the way he did so he could marry his 
long-term partner.
260
   
Several hidden assumptions lurk behind this curtain.  Most obvious is 
the assumption that Judge Walker could not be fair or impartial because of his 
sexual orientation and, correlatively, that a heterosexual judge would auto-
matically have been fair and impartial because of his or her sexual orienta-
tion.  This accusation that a judge will be unfair because he or she could issue 
a ruling that positively affects the judge seems to align with the position that 
the judge should recuse himself or herself because he or she has a conflict of 
interest in deciding the case.  But this is a red herring, which becomes obvi-
ous when viewed from a different perspective.  
More realistically, the accusation that Judge Walker was unfairly biased 
likely stems from a prejudice against homosexuals, based on conscious and 
unconscious homophobia by different members of the protestors.  This can be 
deduced by exposing a perhaps less obvious assumption that appears neutral 
to many equality-minded people: that a heterosexual judge would have ruled 
the other way and upheld the ban on gay marriage.  We know these assump-
tions operated in this case because otherwise there would not have been such 
public outrage.  If those people who were upset with Judge Walker’s ruling 
had thought it was “fair,” they would have had no basis for trying to invali-
date it.  By calling for a heterosexual judge to decide the case, those people 
who were upset clearly wanted a different outcome, which from their view 
would have been fair.  
What many equality-minded people miss in a situation like this is obvi-
ated upon learning some of the lessons offered by identity scholarship.  Just 
as any judge deciding a race discrimination case has a racial identity, or as 
any judge deciding a sex discrimination case has a gender identity, any judge 
deciding a sexual orientation discrimination case will have a sexual orienta-
  
 257. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 258. See Lindenberger, supra note 252. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
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tion identity.  And, in fact, an individual’s identity will be a mixture of certain 
traits – a black female judge or a white heterosexual judge, for example.
261
   
Identity has always mattered because of the experiential biases that at-
tach to identity.  Generally, though, the identities of historically privileged 
groups set a baseline for what is considered “neutral” or “objective” and this 
enabled those identities to become invisible even as they empowered those 
people who shared them.  Identity scholarship is premised on exposing how 
the law functions to protect historically privileged groups based on their race 
(Caucasian), sex (male), sexual orientation (heterosexual), religion, (Chris-
tian), and so forth.
262
  
Social science also supports the critical observations of identity scholars.  
Returning to the context of race and employment discrimination, empirical 
studies show that the race of the judge and the plaintiff is statistically relevant 
in predicting whether a case survives summary judgment.
263
  For example, 
“[w]hite judges are far more likely to dispose of any employment discrimina-
tion case at the summary judgment phase than are minority judges.”
264
  
Moreover, “white judges tend to dismiss cases involving minority plaintiffs at 
a much higher rate than cases involving white plaintiffs.”
265
  Interestingly, 
minority judges dismissed cases of minority plaintiffs at a higher rate than 
they dismissed cases of white plaintiffs.
266
  Professors Jill Weinberg and 
Laura Nielsen suggest that these outcomes are consistent with other research 
that shows that people “are more or less likely to perceive the presence of 
discrimination based on their identification with a stigmatized social 
group.”
267
  Again, this is consistent with valuing the Group Equality Principle 
and with the concept of “critical mass.”  
All judges bring to the bench their experiential biases, but this is far 
from saying that judges are unfairly biased because of who they are.  But who 
they are still matters because experiential bias influences decision making.  
Social science studies indicate that people can be taught to be more empathic 
toward people who have different identity traits.
268
  As expressed above, 
learning to be empathic toward others is facilitated by being actively engaged 
with them, for example, in a school setting.  High empathy skills are yet an-
other sign of high emotional intelligence.
269
  Today, equality-minded people 
  
 261. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-
racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). 
 262. See, e.g., id. at 140; James, supra note 170.  
 263. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimina-
tion, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 347 (2012). 
 264. Id. at 346. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 326.  
 268. Id. at 349-50. 
 269. Goleman, supra note 198, at 105.   
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are working diligently to undo the harm caused by laws that promote inequal-
ity.  They are learning about the unfairness of stereotypes and trying to avoid 
basing decisions on them.  
This Article merely highlights that geographic identity is yet another 
factor that influences decision making, sometimes in strangely obvious or 
not-so-obvious ways.  “For reasons that remain unclear, for example, during 
the period from 1973 to 1990 federal courts in the West were less receptive to 
abortion rights than were federal courts in other regions of the country.”
270
  It 
may not come as a surprise to learn that the five states with the highest aver-
age ages of marriage are in the Northeast, or that “[t]he states with the lowest 
average ages of marriage . . . are in the South, the mountain west, or the bor-
der between the North-South border . . .”
271
  Generally, and consistent with 
federalism, family law cases belong in state courts;
272
 but many family issues 
relate to questions that, for some state citizens, involve morality and implicate 
constitutional questions about equality and due process.  The marriage laws in 
states reflect the states’ norms and are consistent with their political identities 
as either “liberal” or “conservative.”  It is important to remember, however, 
that these labels are generalities and states should not be stereotyped or pi-
geon-holed into reified historical identities that they are not allowed to over-
come.  This is exactly what Shelby County
273
 was about – had Shelby County 
corrected its prior identity as a county that discriminates on the basis of race 
in elections, and if so, did Congress continue to have the power to enforce the 
Voting Rights Act in that county?  
Experiential bias based on geographic identity is a unique kind of bias 
that may or may not have anything to do with unfair bias against people based 
on their race, ethnicity, gender, or other identity traits.  For example, an Alas-
kan Article III judge presumably will not let his or her state identity unfairly 
affect a case, but the Alaskan judge will nevertheless always be a representa-
tive of Alaska and have “experiential” bias.  If a case were to arise involving 
an issue especially important to Alaska – for example, drilling for oil off the 
coast – we presume the Article III judge could and would avoid being unfair-
ly affected by his or her biases stemming from the geographic connection 
between the judge and one of the litigants.  With respect to conscious geo-
graphic bias, we believe he or she would be able to avoid that, but we also 
know unconscious bias is real.  Modern social science studies show that an 
individual with a strong “environmental identity” has “less difficulty and 
greater confidence” in making decisions that have an impact on the environ-
  
 270. Purcell, supra note 38, at 719. 
 271. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 267, 
289-90 (2008).  The five Northeastern states are Massachusetts, New York, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey.  Id. at 289.  The states with the lowest average 
ages are Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky.  Id. at 290.  
 272. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction 
and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1984).  
 273. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618-19 (2013). 
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ment.
274
  Consistent with this modern research, one could reasonably expect 
that the Alaskan judge, because of his or her Alaskan “experiential” identity, 
would view and understand the dynamics of the drilling case in a way that a 
non-Alaskan judge might not.  The two judges might even reach different 
conclusions.  Significantly, different conclusions would not necessarily be the 
result of unfair bias.  Rather, they might be the result of different interpreta-
tions and understandings of the case – in other words, the result of the judges 
being two different people with two different life experiences.
275
  Justice By-
ron White appreciated having Justice Thurgood Marshall on the Court, be-
cause Justice Marshall “ . . . would tell us things that we knew but would 
rather forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations 
of our own experience.”
276
  That is why the Article III judiciary must be geo-
graphically diverse.  Each state, as a matter of sovereignty, has a right under 
federalism principles to have its voice heard from the Article III bench.    
In light of the theory behind diversity jurisdiction – to avoid a judge’s 
state identity from unfairly influencing his or her judgment – it seems coun-
terintuitive to suggest that a state has a “right” to be represented on the Arti-
cle III bench.  But it is worth highlighting that federalism requires a geo-
graphically diverse judiciary.  We presume judges know when to recuse 
themselves because of their own limited abilities to be fair, but we also know 
that unconscious bias influences judges’ decisions.  Chief Justice Roberts 
recently articulated that public officials can most easily avoid race discrimi-
nation by adopting a colorblind philosophy,
277
 a view many people eschew.  
Unlike the debate over colorblindness, not only does the Constitution not 
require that we be blind to geographic diversity, but the very foundation of 
federalism is premised on acknowledging and valuing that diversity.  Federal-
ism protects the equality of states with respect to their “rights” to be treated as 
equal by the national government.  Not only does geographic identity help 
shape one’s views, like other identity traits do, but it is precisely because we 
  
 274. Patrick Devine-Wright & Susan Clayton, Introduction to the Special Issue: 
Place, Identity and Environmental Behavior, 30 J. OF ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 267,         
268 (2010).  
 275. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Chart-
ing the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); see also Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30,                
at 1849-50. 
 276. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1215, 1216 (1992).  
 277. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007) (Roberts, J., plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).  The idea that the “[C]onstitution 
is colorblind” ironically comes from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in 
which the Court upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine.  163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  
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do not know if a particular bias is unfair that any chances that it might be 
must be born equally among a holistically diverse federal judiciary. 
VII.  THE SUPREME COURT 
As the institution in the United States that tells us “what the law is,”
278
 it 
is especially important for the Supreme Court, as an anti-majoritarian institu-
tion, to be representative of the people.  Naturally, reasonable people disagree 
on what it means for the Justices to be representative of the people.  For ex-
ample, although the Constitution does not require the Justices to have any 
particular qualifications, all 112 Justices have been lawyers; however, some 
people might argue that lawyers are not representative of the people.  Moreo-
ver, even if one thinks that being a lawyer is a reasonable qualification to 
expect of Justices, who, as Hamilton put it, are the “guardians of the Constitu-
tion,”
279
 one might nevertheless be concerned about the growing tendency for 
the Justices to receive their legal education at a few elite law schools – all of 
which happen to be in the Northeast.
280
  These types of concerns raise diversi-
ty issues, which in turn raise issues about equality and representation.
281
   
Geographic diversity, in contrast, raises questions about federalism and 
representation.  Accordingly, it is logical to consider the role federalism and 
states should play in making the Court representative of the people.  As ex-
plored below, it is clear that geography played a much more significant role at 
the beginning of the nation’s history.  Some scholars have called for a modi-
fication of the current Court’s operations, primarily for efficiency reasons, 
including the possibility of increasing the number of Justices.
282
  Consistent 
with those proposals and this Article, a geographically representative Court 
could have a Justice from each of the regional circuits.  At a minimum, this 
  
 278. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 279. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 280. Barton, supra note 39, at 1168-70.  Currently, all of the Justices attended 
either Harvard or Yale.  Id. at 1139.  Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard but received 
her law degree from Columbia Law School, which is also an Ivy League school.  See 
id. at 1187; Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME 
COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014).  Notably, this cluster of law schools is geographically isolated in the Northeast.  
See Barton, supra note 39, at 1164. 
 281. For example, six current Justices, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Thomas, 
and Sotomayor, are Catholic.  Michael Paulson, Sotomayor Would Be Sixth Catholic 
Justice, BOSTON GLOBE (May 26, 2009, 2:33 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/ 
local/articles_of_faith/2009/05/sotomayor_would.html.  
 282. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the 
Supreme Court, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 645, 647 (2009); Jonathan Turley, A Bigger, Better 
Supreme Court: The Case for Reform, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/27/bigger-bet-ter-supreme-
court-reform. 
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Article suggests that those involved in the confirmation process should be 
more sensitive to, and appreciative of, the relationship among federalism, 
diversity, and equality to achieve greater geographic diversity on the Court.
283
 
A.  Geographic Diversity and Federalism 
1.  Early History 
Historically, there are at least four indications of the importance of ge-
ography in establishing a strong relationship between the Supreme Court and 
the states.  First, Article III provides that there is only one Supreme Court, 
which interestingly did not have a permanent home until 1935.
284
  Prior to 
that, and while Washington, D.C. was under construction, the then six Justic-
es of the Court met in New York City and then in Philadelphia.
285
  In 1800, 
Washington, D.C. became the seat of the national government, but the Court 
did not have its own building until Chief Justice William Howard Taft per-
suaded Congress that the Court deserved and needed a permanent resi-
dence.
286
  Finally, construction on the Supreme Court building was completed 
in 1935.
287
  It is logical and consistent with treating the states equally that the 
Court is not situated in any one state.   
Second, the Framers also gave careful consideration to establishing an 
equal relationship among the states with the Court.  Highlighting an earlier 
observation, to minimize the possibility that judicial nominees would come 
disproportionately from the larger states, thus excluding the voices of smaller 
states, the Framers provided in Article III for Senate confirmation of all Arti-
cle III judges, including Justices of the Supreme Court.
288
  Moreover, senators 
are heavily involved in the nomination process for lower federal court judg-
es.
289
  Through judicial selection commissions, senators can nominate candi-
dates – perhaps the most direct way for states’ voices to be heard.  Their par-
ticipation certainly adds geographic diversity to the process.
290
  Critically, 
heavy involvement of senators in the nomination process for lower federal 
  
 283. See infra Part VII.B.  
 284. The Court Building, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/courtbuilding.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1496 (1992).  
 289. Clark, supra note 58, at 465-67; see also DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. (CRS), SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE 
PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 2-3 (July 6, 2005), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50146.pdf.  
 290. Clark, supra note 58, at 465. 
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on:  6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
172 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
judges increasingly affects who ultimately sits on the Court because nominees 
increasingly have court of appeals experience.  
A third and extremely significant indication of the importance of        
geography in the relationship between the Court and the states lies in the way 
Congress structured the Article III judiciary and established the policy          
of “circuit riding.”
291
  Specifically, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress 
created circuit courts and, rather than staffing them with circuit judges,    
provided for the Supreme Court Justices to “ride circuit.”
292
  Two Justices 
would be assigned to a circuit where they lived
293
 and, together with the   
district court judge in the region, would hold court.
294
  Circuit riding served 
several purposes, including “[keeping] the Federal Judiciary in touch with the 
local communities.”
295
 
The value of having the Justices ride circuit, ironically, was to facilitate 
the development of a uniform body of federal law and give “the people of 
every state a sense of national judicial power through the presence of the Su-
preme Court Justices.”
296
  From this view, it seems that the relationship be-
tween the local and national judiciaries primarily served the Federalists’ 
goals.  Through circuit riding, the people could see the value of having a 
strong centralized government by watching the Supreme Court Justices in 
action in their own geographic areas.  
From the states’ views, though, it was important for the circuit Justices 
to be familiar with their circuit’s state laws, because most of the circuit 
courts’ dockets involved diversity cases.  The late Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that all of the Justices, because they rode circuit, had to have 
knowledge of the law in their circuits.
297
  It is important to keep in mind, of 
course, that state law controlled issues in diversity cases and judges did not 
draw on general federal common law unless they were filling in voids they 
believed were left by a state’s laws.  From the states’ views, then, riding cir-
cuit allowed the Justices to protect state sovereignty.  
  
 291. Thomas E. Baker, PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEAL 5 (2d ed. 2009). 
 292. Id.  
 293. See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the His-
tory of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1761 (2003).  The Act of 1789 did 
not require that the Justice be a resident of his circuit; the Court adopted this rule.  See 
id. at 1757. 
 294. Id.  Congress was concerned, for example, about the costs associated with 
creating circuit court judges.  Id. at 1757-58. 
 295. Id. at 1759 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 58 (1926)). 
 296. Id. (quoting MARTIN H. REDISH ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 100 
app., at 12 (3d ed. 1997)). 
 297. Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).  
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
2014] FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES 173 
Circuit riding immediately became unpopular with the Justices because 
the burden of traveling literally exhausted them even though they lived within 
their circuits.  Pleas to Congress to abolish the practice fell on deaf ears for 
over 100 years.
298
  As the country expanded, Congress provided for more 
circuits.  Beginning with the creation of the Seventh Circuit in 1807, Con-
gress increased the number of Justices on the Court to seven.
299
  The newly 
added Justices were then responsible for riding circuit in the newly-
established circuits.
300
  This explains why the Court had ten justices in 1863; 
that was the year Congress established the Tenth Circuit.
301
  Notably, this 
period marked the peak of geographic diversity and the concomitant represen-
tation of the states on the Supreme Court.   
A fourth indication of the importance of geographic diversity on the 
Court came from the leadership of President Washington.  He set an early 
tone for ensuring that the Court be geographically diverse, something he 
strongly believed in.
302
  President Washington’s belief in the importance of 
the geographic relationship between the states and the Article III judiciary, 
particularly the Supreme Court, was shared by his Vice President, John Ad-
ams who stated that, 
It would have an [sic] happy effect if all the judges of the national su-
preme Court, could be taken from the chief Justices of the several 
states.  The superiority of the national government would in this way 
be decidedly acknowledged.  All the judges of the states would look 
up to the national bench as their ultimate object.  As there is great 
danger of collisions between the national and state judiciaries, if the 
state judges are men possessed of larger portions of the people’s con-
fidence than the national judges, the latter will become unpopular.
303
 
Realistically, of course, President Washington’s pool of nominees was     
limited because of circuit riding and the need for Justices to live in their   
  
 298. See Glick, supra note 293, at 1755.  
 299. Establishment of the Seventh Circuit: “An Act Establishing Circuit Courts, 
and Abridging the Jurisdiction of the District Courts in the Districts of Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Ohio”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home. 
nsf/page/landmark_05.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 300. Id.  
 301. Establishment of the Tenth Circuit: “An Act to Provide Circuit Courts for  
the Districts of California and Oregon, and for Other Purposes”, FED. JUDICIAL  
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_08.html (last visited Mar. 
21, 2014). 
 302. Maeva Marcus, Federal Judicial Selection: The First Decade, 39 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 797, 800 (2005). 
 303. Id. at 801 (quoting from a letter from John Adams to Stephen Higginson 
(Sept. 21, 1789), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 663 (MAEVA MARCUS & JAMES R. PERRY 
EDS., 1985)).  
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circuits.  But President Washington’s commitment to geographic diversity 
was much deeper.  He wanted to avoid creating “jealousy” among the     
states by appointing more than one nominee from a state to the Supreme 
Court.
304
  He stated, “It would be inexpedient to take two of the Associate 
Judges from the same state.  The practice has been to . . . disseminate them 
through the United States.”
305
  
Following President Washington’s lead, subsequent presidents also 
heeded the need for geographic diversity on the Court.  For example, when 
Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts died, President Madison kept nom-
inating candidates from Massachusetts, finally settling on Justice Story in 
1811.
306
  Beginning with President Lincoln’s term, however, concerns about 
geographic diversity took on two added dimensions – issues related to the 
Civil War and Congress’ creation of the courts of appeals. 
The seat first occupied by John Rutledge of South Carolina in 1789 be-
came known as the “southern” seat.
307
  However, that changed after the Civil 
War because Republicans, who were a majority in Congress, were concerned 
that the slave states had too strong a voice on the Court.
308
  At the time, recall 
that each circuit had a representative on the Court, and as a result, five of the 
nine circuits that existed before 1863 included only slave states.
309
  In 1866, 
to reduce the influence of southern states on the Court, Congress reduced the 
number of Justices to seven and the number of circuits from ten to nine, in-
cluding only two (the Fourth Circuit and what was then the Fifth Circuit) that 
consisted entirely of former slave states.
310
  Congress restored the Court to 
nine Justices in 1869.
311
 
Congress’ modification of the Court’s structure in light of its view that 
the former slave states had too much influence on the Court is evidence of a 
belief that geographic identity has, or is perceived to have, an influence on a 
  
 304. Id. at 800. 
 305. Epstein et al., supra note 42, at 613 (quoting WILLIAM J. DANIELS, THE 
GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN APPOINTMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
1789-1976, 31 W. POL. Q. 226, 227 (1978)). 
 306. Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Justice: Parity and the United States Su-
preme Court, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 48-49 (2007). 
 307. David M. O’Brien, Packing the Supreme Court, 1986 VA. Q. REV. 189,   
212 (1986).  
 308. Judicial Legislation, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
home.nsf/page/landmark_09.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 309. Reorganization of the Judicial Circuits: “An Act to Fix the Number of Judges 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to Change Certain Judicial Circuits”, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_09.html 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 310. Id. 
 311. The Judiciary Act of 1869: “An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the 
United States”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/land-
mark_10.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
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judge’s decision making.  If nothing else, it shows how important a state’s 
identity can be with respect to the Supreme Court.  From 1867 to 1877, the 
“southern” seat on the Court vanished.
 312
  President Lincoln had five oppor-
tunities to appoint people to the Court.
313
  Not surprisingly, with the Civil 
War influence he was especially sensitive to geography and the South’s iden-
tity as slave territory.  And while he did not appoint anyone from the South, 
he did use his five appointments to select men from four different states: Ohio 
(two), Iowa, Illinois, and California.
314
  
Shortly after Congress created the courts of appeals in 1891, presidents’ 
nominees to the Court started to come from judges who had already been on 
the courts of appeals.
315
  Justice Howell Jackson, for example, was elevated 
from the Sixth Circuit to the Supreme Court in 1893.
316
  President Eisenhow-
er openly proclaimed that he would nominate candidates for the courts of 
appeals with an eye to his nominees ultimately reaching the Supreme 
Court.
317
  Today, Justice Kagan is the only Justice who does not have court of 
appeals experience.
318
  
2.  The Waning Importance of Geographic Diversity 
Since our early history, some aspects of the Article III judiciary have re-
flected the continuing sentiment that geographic diversity is important.  For 
example, although circuit riding stopped in 1891 with Congress’ establish-
  
 312. See O’Brien, supra note 307.  Justice Wayne from Georgia died in 1867 and 
was replaced by Justice Bradley from New Jersey.  JONATHAN D. VARAT, WILLIAM 
COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1732 
(14th
 
ed. 2013).  In 1877, Justice Harlan of Kentucky was appointed to the Court by 
President Hayes.  Id. at 1733.  Justice Powell of Virginia retired in 1987 and was 
replaced by Justice Kennedy of California in 1988.  Id. at 1737.  Justice Thomas of 
Georgia was appointed by President G.H.W. Bush in 1991 and is currently serving on 
the Court.  Id. at 1738.  In 2005, he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts of Maryland, 
who was appointed by President G.W. Bush.  Id. 
 313. VARAT ET AL., supra note 312, at 1732. 
 314. Id.  President Lincoln appointed Justices Chase and Swayne of Ohio, Justice 
Miller of Iowa, Justices Davis of Illinois and Justice Field of California.  Id.  
 315. SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, RESEARCH SERV., R40802, SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION, 1789-2010, at 17 (2010). 
 316. Joseph Jackson, 1898-1925, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.supreme 
courthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/howell-jackson-1893-1895/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
 317. Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 835. 
 318. Jonathan H. Adler, National Review: Watching an Inexperienced Justice, 
NPR (Oct. 4, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=130320426. 
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ment of the circuit courts of appeals,
319
 Congress still requires that each cir-
cuit be represented by at least one Supreme Court Justice.
320
  In their capaci-
ties as circuit representatives, the Justices typically hear emergency appeals 
and rarely sit as circuit judges.
321
  When a new Justice joins the Court, the 
Chief Justice reviews the circuit assignments and makes adjustments.
322
  The 
Chief Justice is assigned to the D.C., Fourth, and Federal Circuits.
323
  It ap-
pears that whenever possible, the Chief Justice assigns the Associate Justices 
to their “home court” circuit when those become available.
324
  Currently, 
Justices who are assigned to their “home” circuits include Justice Breyer 
(First), Justice Ginsburg (Second), Justice Alito (Third), Justice Kennedy 
(Ninth), and Justice Thomas (Eleventh).
325
  Justice Scalia is assigned to the 
Fifth Circuit, an assignment originally made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
1987.
326
  Justice Alito is also assigned to the Eighth Circuit.
327
  Justice So-
tomayor is assigned to the Tenth Circuit (replacing Justice Breyer, who was 
re-assigned to the First Circuit when Justice Souter retired), and Justice Ka-
gan, the newest Justice, is assigned to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits (which 
were represented by Justice Stevens before his retirement).
328
 
Because the Justices rarely, if ever, sit as judges in their home cir-   
cuits, their assignments are largely about representation.  They represent  
their “homes” and the people living there.  Justice Thomas, for example,       
is assigned to the Eleventh Circuit and when he visits the University of    
Florida, he always makes a point of calling this circuit his circuit.
329
  In his 
warm and gracious way, Justice Thomas connects with his “home” audience 
and offers reassurances that he, as the circuit Justice, is constitutionally con-
  
 319. Establishment of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_12.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014).  The legislation that abolished circuit riding is known as the Evarts Act.  Id.  
That Act did not eliminate the circuit courts, however.  They were abolished in 1911.  
The Judicial Code of 1911 and the Abolition of the U.S. Circuit Courts, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_13.html (last visited Mar. 
21, 2014).  
 320. 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2012) (“A justice may be assigned to more than one circuit, 
and two or more justices may be assigned to the same circuit.”).  
 321. Supreme Court of the United States, JUDGEPEDIA, http://judgepedia.org/ 
Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 322. See 28 U.S.C. § 42. 
 323. Circuit Allotment of Justices, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ALLOTMENTORDER9-28-10.pdf. 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id.  
 326. Id.; 2d Justice for Fifth Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/us/2d-justice-for-fifth-circuit.html. 
 327. Circuit Allotment of Justices, supra note 323. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Lindy McCollum-Brounley, Supreme Visit, UF LAW (Feb. 4, 2010), 
https://www.law.ufl.edu/uflaw/feature/supreme-visit-2. 
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nected to the circuit’s citizens.  And his ideology has nothing to do with this 
sentiment; it is simply a geographic bond that is deeply rooted in federalism 
and shared identities.  
Beginning with President Nixon’s term, however, geographic diversity 
has played less and less of a role with respect to the appointment of Supreme 
Court Justices.  Some people suggest that it should be less important alto-
gether in light of modern technology and the ability of people to connect with 
each other around the world in a matter of seconds.
330
  But federalism will 
always connect geographic diversity with the Article III judiciary, particularly 
at the lower court level because of the way the judiciary is structured and the 
involvement of the Senate in the confirmation process.  Still, the connection 
is weakening at the Supreme Court level.  In the last twenty-seven years, a 
little longer than the twenty-five year time period Justice O’Connor gave for 
state colleges and universities to consider race in their admissions,
331
 there 
have been thirteen Justices who self-identify as representing ten different 
states: Arizona (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), Illinois (Jus-
tices Stevens), California (Justice Kennedy), New Hampshire (Justice Sout-
er), Massachusetts (Justices Breyer and Kagan), New Jersey (Justice Alito), 
Georgia (Justice Thomas), Maryland (Chief Justice Roberts), Virginia (Jus-
tice Scalia), and New York (Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor).
332
  The last 
“new” state to be represented on the Court is Arizona, with the appointment 
of Justice Rehnquist in 1972 by President Nixon.
333
  Prior to that, the newest 
state was Colorado in 1962 with the appointment of Justice White by Presi-
dent Kennedy.
334
  Nineteen states have never been represented on the Court: 
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
335
 
Another major concern that can be traced to the 1960s is the shrinking 
pool from which potential nominees are selected.  Specifically, since Justice 
  
 330. See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54 (suggesting there is less con-
cern about state courts being biased against federal claims because of “[c]enturies of 
economic and . . . political and cultural interconnectedness . . . .”).  
 331. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 332. The Supreme Court website identifies the states with which the individual justic-
es identify. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUPREME 
COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014). It is worth noting that when initially appointed to the Court, Justice Rehnquist 
identified as an Arizonan, but when elevated to Chief Justice, he identified as a Vir-
ginian. Id. 
 333. See id.  
 334. See id.  
 335. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-
Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1163, 1163 n.82 (2012); Members of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supreme-
court.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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Thurgood Marshall was appointed to the Court from the Second Circuit        
in 1967, only Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kagan have not been court of 
appeals judges.
336
  Since 1967, just over eighty-one percent of the Justices 
had court of appeals experience.
337
  One positive observation from this trend 
is that states’ voices are playing a greater role in the selection of Supreme 
Court Justices.  Their role in confirming lower court Article III judges,     
particularly court of appeals judges, is much more critical now that most  
Supreme Court nominees come from the courts of appeals.  On the other 
hand, of the thirteen Justices since 1967 with court of appeals experience, 
Chief Justices Burger and Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg 
all were elevated from the United States Court of Appeals for the District     
of Columbia Circuit – a little over thirty-eight percent of the total number of 
Justices selected over that period.
338
  This observation is not meant to dimin-
ish the qualifications of the Justices or any court of appeals judge.  Rather,    
it is merely to suggest that the pool of potential nominees could be much 
larger and include nominees with different experiences.  For example,         
the pool could include state judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, and 
even politicians.
339
  
Should we, as a society, be concerned that virtually all Supreme Court 
nominees come from the courts of appeals?  Should we be concerned that 
almost half of the current Justices were elevated from the same court of ap-
peals?  Does that give their home circuit too much representation at the ex-
pense of other circuits, diminishing the principle of federalism and its role in 
the Article III judiciary?  
Some empirical research shows that, just like the racial identity of a 
judge is statistically significant in affecting the outcome in some types of 
cases as discussed above,
340
 so too can the geographic identity of a judge be 
statistically significant.  Calling it the “circuit effects,” Professors Lee Ep-
stein, Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, and Jeffrey Segal’s empirical research 
led them to be concerned about “the possibility that federal-appellate-judges-
turned-Supreme-Court-Justices are predisposed to affirm decisions coming 
  
 336. See Associate Judges: Thurgood Marshall, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#Marshall (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014); Associate Judges: Lewis F. Powell, Jr., LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www. 
law.cor-nell.edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#powell (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); As-
sociate Justices: Sandra Day O’Connor, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell. 
edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#oconnor (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Biographies of 
Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280. 
 337. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332.  
 338. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280; 
Chief Justices: Warren E. Burger, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell. 
edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#burger (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 339. See Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 834. 
 340. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. 
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from the circuits they just left.”
341
  They caution that their research does not 
find “circuit effects in the form of Justices consistently biased towards all the 
U.S. courts of appeals.”
342
  However, their empirical studies show that “[f]or 
some [Justices], the attachment [to their home circuit] is so strong that [the 
Justice is] twice as likely to affirm decisions coming from [the Justice’s] for-
mer circuit as decisions coming from all others.”
343
  The authors are especial-
ly concerned that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Ginsburg all were elevated to the Court from the D.C. Circuit, giving cases on 
appeal from that circuit a huge advantage.
344
  Admittedly, and presumably, a 
justice who is inclined to be unfairly biased because of his or her geographic 
identity probably does not even realize it.  Because empirical studies show 
that the Justices tend to favor their circuits in cases before the Court, the re-
searchers conclude that the “norm has created a collective presumption in 
favor of decisions handed down by the D.C. Circuit judges.”
345
    
As the Court becomes less geographically diverse, we, as a society, 
seem to become less aware of what the trend means.  Here, a few lessons can 
be learned from the Civil War era.  Specifically, the reaction of Congress and 
its efforts to reduce the influence of the former slave states by manipulating 
the number of circuits and the number of justices gives pause for reflection 
about what state identity means and how it relates to federalism, diversity, 
equality, and Article III.  A significant lesson can be learned from comparing 
the opportunities President Lincoln had to appoint a Justice from the South 
with the opportunities President Nixon had to do the same.   
Clearly, Congress operated on the assumption that if President          
Lincoln’s nominees came from southern states they would support slavery.  
And, perhaps as a matter of politics and the need to be politically supported, 
that was a realistic assumption.  But to support slavery is to deny the humani-
ty of blacks, as abolitionists and civil rights advocates acknowledged,        
and would make someone clearly prejudiced.  This helps explain, perhaps, 
why President Lincoln did not nominate anyone from the South, although he 
had five chances. 
Now consider the situation with President Nixon.  He had the opportuni-
ty in 1969 to replace Justice Fortas from Tennessee, and he selected his nom-
inees on the conviction that people from the South “deserve representation on 
  
 341. Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 837.  
 342. Id. at 837-38. 
 343. Id. at 834.  In a footnote, the authors share that “in cases coming to the   
Supreme Court from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the pre-       
dicted probability of Justice Stephen Breyer – a former judge on that court – casting   
a vote to affirm is 0.69; for cases coming from all other circuits, that figure is 0.29.”  
Id. at 838 n.16. 
 344. Id. at 834, 838. 
 345. Id. at 838. 
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the Court.”
346
  At the time, Justice Black of Alabama occupied the “southern” 
seat;
347
 however, having another representative from the South would have 
been consistent with geographic diversity.  
In the 1960s, of course, the civil rights movement was in full swing.  
The South openly resisted integration and insisted on keeping its historical 
identity as a part of the country that did not support racial equality.  Ignoring 
that reality, President Nixon nominated two southerners: Clement 
Haynsworth from South Carolina, and Harold Carswell from Florida.
348
  Both 
men failed to get Senate confirmation and suffered this defeat at least partly 
because of their records in support of segregation, which caused strong oppo-
sition from civil rights groups.
349
  Once again, the identity of southern states 
as “racist” in violation of the Equality Principles figured prominently into the 
politics associated with Article III.  
One lesson learned was that the South’s identity as former “slave territo-
ry” and as “segregationists” played a role in President Lincoln’s decision    
not to nominate someone from the South.  By the time President Nixon   
nominated Haynsworth and Carswell, it was very clear that the people did not 
want racially-prejudiced Justices.  To his credit, however, President Nixon 
stood by his belief that the South deserved to be represented on the Court.  
His misstep, then, was not nominating someone from the South; his mis-   
step was nominating someone from the South with an identity that reflected a 
South that did not believe in the Equality Principles.  In other words,       
President Nixon misjudged the senators who had to confirm his nominees.  
Consistent with their oaths to uphold the Constitution, they were unwilling to 
confirm nominees who supported segregation in violation of the Equality 
Principles.  The senators who voted “no” on Haynsworth and Carswell re-
spected the delicate relationship among federalism, diversity, equality, and 
the Article III judiciary.  
Moreover, negative votes that respect that delicate balance are qualita-
tively different from negative votes that are based on ideology and are there-
fore purely political.  This was the situation that caused the defeat of Judge 
Robert Bork, who took an ideological stand about the “proper” way to inter-
pret the Constitution that most senators disagreed with.
350
  Ultimately, Presi-
dent Nixon secured Senate confirmation of Justice Blackmun of Minnesota 
even though Chief Justice Burger, also of Minnesota, was appointed to the 
  
 346. Richard Nixon, Statement About Nominations to the Supreme Court, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 9, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2456.   
 347. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332.  
 348. Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomi-
nation in the Nixon Administration, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 266, 268 (1998). 
 349. Supreme Court Nomination Battles: Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold 
Carswell, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1895 
379_1895421_1895542,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 350. See, e.g., Stephan O. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirma-
tions in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 247, 328 (1999). 
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Court in the previous year.
351
  In the history of the Court, the only other Jus-
tice from Minnesota was Justice Butler, who was appointed by President 
Harding in 1923.
352
 
But it is important to remember that just because a state has an identity 
with respect to a particular issue, it does not mean that all of its citizens align 
with that identity.  It is just as misguided to essentialize state citizens in the 
context of federalism as it is to essentialize individuals in the context of the 
Group Equality Principle.  Some citizens did not support segregation and may 
have lived in states with Jim Crow laws.  Today, someone can be a citizen of 
a “medical marijuana” state and be opposed to this, yet still strongly identify 
with his or her state.  In fact, to ignore the experiential diversity among citi-
zens within a state is inconsistent with the Equality Principles.  
The empirical research that supports the “circuit effects” also gives 
pause for reflection.  Certainly, one way to avoid that bias is for presidents to 
select nominees who are not already federal judges.
353
  But to disregard a 
state’s right to be represented on the Court is inconsistent with federalism.  
Except for the years 1867 to 1877, and again from 1987 to 1991, there has 
always been a Justice from the South
354
 on the Court.  Currently, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts of Maryland and Justice Thomas of Georgia are from the 
South.
355
  As noted earlier, the greatest percentage of African Americans in 
the United States live in the South.
356
  The experiences of an African Ameri-
can from the South undoubtedly brings legitimacy to the Court – both as a 
matter of federalism and consistent with the Equality Principles.  Justice 
Thomas exemplifies this.  Moreover, having an African American from the 
South, regardless of his or her judicial ideology, is one way to begin to 
change the historical identity that many in the South want to leave behind. 
Significantly, no other issue since slavery has so sharply shaped a state’s 
identity and, in the larger picture, whole geographic regions.  The slavery 
issue was unique in dividing the country into two geographic regions: 
south/slave and north/free.  And many issues currently in the political spot-
  
 351. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332; 
Chief Justices: Warren E. Burger, supra note 338. 
 352. See Members of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, supra note 332. 
 353. See supra note 350. 
 354. See Members of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, supra note 332.  The 
“South” generally is defined as those states below the Mason Dixon Line, the Ohio 
River and the 36th parallel, and includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, D.C., Flori-
da, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  The South, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555542/ 
the-South (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 355. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280. 
 356. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, The Black Population: 2010, 
2010 U.S. CENSUS (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/ 
briefs/c2010br-06.pdf. 
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light remind us of how intense the debate between states’ rights and individu-
al rights can be; abortion and gun control are two poignant examples.  But as 
intense as the political fight is in those debates, they are not tied to geograph-
ic regions in the same way slavery was. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggesting that a Justice is more like-
ly to vote in favor of his home circuit brings us full circle.  Everyone is aware 
that there are ideological differences among Chief Justice Roberts and Justic-
es Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas.  Everyone is aware that they also hold dif-
ferent views about how best to uphold the Equality Principles.  What the em-
pirical evidence suggests, however, is that perhaps judges – at all levels and 
regardless of ideology – have an unconscious bias that causes them to vote 
for the “home team.”  This is the very fear behind the creation of diversity 
jurisdiction, which, ironically, is not supported by empirical evidence.   
B.  Suggestions for Increasing Geographic Diversity 
Some scholars are exploring different ways to address problems they see 
with the way the current Court functions.  For example, Professors Adam 
Morse and Julian Yap propose increasing the number of Justices to fifteen 
and dividing cases among panels of nine Justices.
357
  They estimate that this 
model would enable the Court to increase the number of cases it hears from 
roughly seventy-four to 135.
358
  Professors Michael Dorf and Lisa McElory 
propose that retired Justices be allowed to hear cases when a sitting Justice 
has to recuse himself or herself.
359
  Professors Paul Carrington and Roger 
Cramton propose the creation of a specialized court to decide which cases 
should be granted certiorari for review by the Supreme Court.
360
  Their basic 
premise is that the Court should be deciding more cases and relying less on 
their clerks to decide which cases the Court should hear.  Their proposal is to 
create the “Certiorari Division of the Supreme Court.”
361
 
These examples highlight that some scholars think the Court’s method 
of operation could be improved.  This Article agrees and suggests that greater 
geographic diversity on the Court would be consistent with federalism and 
equality.  One way to achieve this goal would be to increase the number of 
Justices on the Court.  Obviously, the Court cannot have fifty Justices; how-
ever, a viable option is to have at least one Justice from each of the geograph-
  
 357. Adam H. Morse & Julian E. Yap, A Panel-Based Supreme Court, 37 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 23, 25 (2011). 
 358. Id. at 32, 42. 
 359. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Poli-
cy Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the 
Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 83-84 (2011). 
 360. Paul. D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in        
Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 
591 (2009).  
 361. Id. at 632. 
File: Rush – Final Edits Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM 
2014] FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES 183 
ic areas – circuits – on the bench.  Recall that this was the situation until con-
cerns about the southern slave states having too much influence on the Court 
caused Congress to reduce the number of circuits and Justices.
362
   
Interestingly, Professors Carrington and Cramton’s proposal to create a 
“Certiorari Division of the Supreme Court” is consistent with this idea.  They 
suggest staffing the Division with thirteen experienced federal judges.
363
  
Significantly, their recommendation to appoint thirteen judges to the Division 
is not arbitrary.  Rather, they are concerned with ensuring geographic repre-
sentation and treating the states, as regional circuits, equally: “One member 
of the group might be drawn from each of the regional circuits to preclude 
suspicion of geographic bias.”
364
  Similarly, thirteen Justices on the Court 
maximizes federalism; the Federal Circuit representative creates an odd num-
ber of Justices, minimizing the chances of tie votes.  Over time, the chances 
of any particular state having a Justice on the Court would be immeasurably 
increased.  But there is federalism value in having each geographic circuit 
represented on the Court.  
Probably the most realistic way to increase geographic diversity on the 
Court is suggested by Professors Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal, who call 
for presidents to be more sensitive to the possibility of putting forward nomi-
nees from underrepresented circuits.
365
  Because there is now a “norm” of 
selecting nominees from the circuit courts, it is important for the President 
and senators to be aware of the “circuit effects” and its implications for pro-
tecting federalism and equality principles.  This knowledge, naturally, can 
become part of the political fodder.  On the other hand, the President and 
senators take oaths to uphold the Constitution.  Equal representation is a core 
democratic value and one that applies to both states and individuals.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The relationship among federalism, diversity, equality, and Article       
III judges is complex and many recent cases highlight how federalism and 
equality often are pitted against each other, as if one value must be more  
important than the other.  This Article illustrates how similar these values are 
in the context of understanding identity and bias.  The age-old reason behind 
diversity jurisdiction – to escape the perceived unfair bias of local state judg-
es who share a geographic identity with the hometown litigant – provides a 
solid foundation for exploring how accusations of that bias are similar to 
  
 362. See supra Part VII.A. 
 363. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 360, at 632.  
 364. Id.  
 365. Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 877.  The authors’ first 
choice for improving the way the Court is structured is for the President to move 
away from the “norm” of nominating sitting court of appeals judges and looking to a 
larger pool of potential candidates, including law professors, legislators, executives, 
and state judges.  Id. at 834. 
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more recent accusations of unfair bias often targeted at historically un-
derrepresented judges when their identities are the same as the litigants who 
appear before them.  
This Article focuses on the idea of “experiential bias” to distinguish it 
from the unfair bias associated with diversity jurisdiction and judges of un-
derrepresented groups.  Experiential bias shapes the identity of every human 
being, including Article III judges.  Moreover, an individual’s experiences are 
shaped by all of their identity traits, including their geographic identity.  Arti-
cle III judges, because they are responsible for protecting all constitutional 
values, must draw on their experiences to determine how to balance compet-
ing values in different situations.  Experiential bias is inevitable and cannot 
automatically disqualify anyone from being a judge; if it did, no one could be 
a judge.  Significantly, being experientially biased does not mean one is 
above the rule of law – quite the opposite, it means one understands how to 
apply the rule of law in ways that respect core constitutional values like fed-
eralism and equality.  It means one has a deep respect for how core constitu-
tional values work together to promote fairness and justice.  Justice Holmes’ 
words of wisdom at the beginning of this Article ring true: “The life of the 
law has not been logic; it has been experience.”  
 
